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OPENING THE GOVERNMENT'S
ELECTRONIC MAIL: PUBLIC ACCESS TO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
RECORDS
I. INTRODUCTION
History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlined, but i ffaced
With courage, need not be lived again.'
Maya Angelou's poem, read at President Clinton's inauguration
in January 1993, recognized the importance of confronting the past.'
She made it dear that we must do so if we are to progress as a nation
or as a people.' Four years earlier, on the eve of another inauguration,
an important segment of our history was almost lost.' On January 19,
1989, the last day of the Reagan Administration, a group of journalists
and non-profit organizations filed a lawsuit against the President and
Vice President of the United States, the National Security Council
("NSC") and the Archivist of the United States, to prevent the destruc-
tion of electronic records on computer back-up tapes of the NSC and
White House electronic mail systems. 5 The tapes were scheduled to be
destroyed in preparation for the change in administration. 6
 The plain-
tiffs later amended their complaint to prevent the destruction of Bush
Administration electronic mail records as wel1. 7
 While the lawsuit pre-
Maya Angelou, On the Pulse of Morning, N.Y. Timm, Jan. 21, 1993, at A14.
2 See id
3 See id.
4 Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Armstrong III (describing the documents at issue in the case as an "entire set of
substantive [electronic mail] documents generated by two administrations over a seven-year
period"). Upholding the preservation of the documents, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit noted that "the substantive importance of these documents is
demonstrated by the frequency with which they have been used in recent years." Id. at 1283 11.7.
5
 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp.
343 (D.D.C. 1989) (No. 89-142).
See id. at 5.
7 Amended Complaint at 11-13, Armstrong v. Bush, 721 E Stipp. 343 (D.D.C. 1989) (No.
89-142) ("WHEREFORE, plaintiff's pray this court:. . 5. Declare that defendants may not
destroy, erase, recycle, or in any way alter information recorded in the PROFS system, front now
on, unless and until they comply with the requirements ....").
1145
1146	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:1145
vented the physical destruction of those records, the risk that their
release may be thwarted remains, at least for the foreseeable future.'
The ability of historians, journalists, biographers and researchers
to access accurate information about governmental decisions and ac-
tions sustains an integral part of the American political system.' The
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the press from
governmental control, and in doing so, imposes a corresponding duty
on the press to inform the public about the workings of government. 10
The right to publish and the duty to inform, however, mean nothing
if the records of government are kept from those who would write
about them." Similarly, the people cannot be informed if the secrets
of government have been destroyed. 12
 Congress has recognized the
importance of preserving our historical heritage and providing public
access to it." Through enactment of various statutes that protect gov-
ernmental records and make them available to subsequent administra-
tions and to the public in general, Congress has sought to strike a
balance between the benefits of preservation and disclosure, and the
risks that premature disclosure pose to the effective workings of gov-
8 See id.; Armstrong II, 1 E3d at 1296 ("Moreover, cross-appellees suggest that the materials
in question may not be subject to the [Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)] . because they
are not 'official records' of the NSC."); Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities In
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on NSC Recordkeeping Claims at 1, Armstrong II, 1
F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142) [hereinafter Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to
Dismiss] (which asserts that all NSC records arc presidential, and, therefore, NSC preservation
guidelines are not subject to judicial review); see also infra notes 169-76 and 200-21 (explaining
the restrictions on disclosure of federal (agency) records versus non-federal records).
9
 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SOURCE BOOK; LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 1 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1974)
[hereinafter SOURCE BOOK 11 (quoting bill-signing statement of Lyndon B. Johnson: "This legis-
lation springs from one of our most essential principles: a democracy works best when the people
have all the infinmation that the security of the Nation permits.").
I° U.S. CoNs .r. amend. I.; New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black,
J., concurring).
II See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 717.
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the Free press the protection
it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.... The press was protected
so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. . . . And
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part
of the government from deceiving the people
Id. (Black, J., concurring).
12 See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1283.
is See 44 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988). The Federal Records Acts describe the objectives of records
management as, "(1) Accurate and complete documentation of the policies and transactions of
the Federal Government . (5) Judicious preservation and disposal of records." Id.; see also 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988). FOIA provides in pertinent part, "Each agency shall make available to
the public information as follows ... ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
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ernment. 14 Recognizing the Government's built-in incentive to hide its
mistakes or downplay unsuccessful policies, Congress created manda-
tory rules regarding what documents will be kept and who will have
access to them.' 5
 Congress has also taken into account the interests of
national security and a desire to encourage executive branch officials
to give frank and honest information and advice to their superiors.' 6
Thus, the records statutes have evolved in an environment of compet-
ing forces, some favoring disclosure, and others favoring continued
restrictions on access. 17
Congress's response to these tensions is embodied in a number of
different statutes that divide all executive branch documents into three
distinct categories: federal records, presidential records and non-re-
cords.''' Because these categories are mutually exclusive, a record must
be subject to either the Presidential Records Act ("PRA") or the Fed-
eral Records Acts ("FRA"), or to neither.' 9
 Federal records are those
11 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in SOURCE Boots I, supra note
9, at 27; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1965), reprinted in SouncE nom( I, supra note 9,
at 41.
15 14.8. RDA , . No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK 1, HOW note
9, at 27; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in SouncE 1300K I, supra note 9,
at 40-41; see also American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("Congress was certainly aware that agencies, left to themselves, have a built-in incentive to dispose
of records relating to 'mistakes' or, less neliiriously, just do not think about preserving 'informa-
tion necessary to protect the legal and financial rights of persons directly affected by agency's
activities.'" (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3101)). For a discussion of congressional power to control presi-
dential effOrts at maintaining secrecy in the areas of national security and foreign affairs, see
James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy Alter the Cold War: The Role of Congress, which concludes
that except in narrow circumstances that are protective of the First Amendment, Congress will
not grant new secrecy powers to the Pre.sident. 34 B.C. L. REV. 451, 455 (1993).
18 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 95th Ca' ing„ 2t1 Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5732,
5737; see also 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (allowing the President to restrict access for 12 years to
"confidential communications requesting or submitting advice, between the President and his
advisors, or between such advisors").
"See infra notes 168-76, 200-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of access to
presidential and federal records.
18
 The three categories are governed by the following statutes:
1) Federal Records (these statutes are known as the "Federal Records Acts" or "FRA"):
Archival Administration, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-18 (1988); Records Management by the Archivist of
the United States and by the Administrator of General Services, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-09 (1988);
Records Management by Federal Agencies, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-07 (1988); Disposal of Records, 44
U.S.C. §§ 3301-24 (1988).
2) Presidential Records (the "Presidential Records Act" or "PRA"): 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-07
(1988).
3) Non-records (materials exempted from the PRA and the FRA): see 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (B)
(listing items exempt from the PRA); 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (defining federal record and listing items
not included) .
19 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (B). The PRA does not apply to any documents covered under the
FRA. hi.; 44 U.S.C. § 3301.
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records created or received by an "agency" of the United States Gov-
ernment which are "made or received by an agency of the United
States Government under federal law or in connection with the trans-
action of public business." 20 In order to ensure maximum public access
to those records, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), which requires agencies to make their records available to
the public.2 ' Administrative decisions regarding the disposal and pres-
ervation of records under FOIA are subject to judicial review.22 Thus,
if the court finds that the the electronic mail in question are agency
records, then researchers, journalists and historians may attempt to
access those documents through FOIA." In addition, if the requestor
of a federal document disagrees with the administration's decision to
release the document, he or she has the option of going to the courts
for redress. 24
In contrast to federal records, which are governed by the ERA and
FOIA, presidential records are governed by the PRA. 25 The PRA applies
to "the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the
Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist
the President."26
 The PRA creates a system of preservation and access
separate from the FRA and FO1A. 27 In addition, decisions regarding
the "creation, management and disposal" of records under the PRA
are not subject to judicial review. 28 A requestor who disagrees with the
20 44 U.S.C. § 3301. To qualify as a federal record, the item must be "appropriate for
preservation . .. as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures,
operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the inlbrmational value of data
in them," Id.
21 5 U.S.C. § 552. FOIA applies to federal records immediately. See id. In contrast, presidential
records that have not been restricted by the President are not subject to FOIA until five years
after the Archivist obtains custody of the document. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(b) (2)(A).
22 American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
judicial review of records disposal and preservation is available); accord Kissinger v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S, 136, 150-51 (1980) (holding that the FRA does not
contain an implied cause of action allowing private parties to bring suit to recover records that
have been unlawfully removed from an agency); ci: Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 292 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Armstrong I] ("Nothing in the Conference Report or the 1984 Amend-
ments indicates a congressional intent to preclude ordinary judicial review of the adequacy of an
agency's recordkeeping guidelines and directives."), further proceedings sub nom. Armstrong v.
Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3(1 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
26 See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
24 American Friends, 720 F.2d at 45.
25 See 44 U.S.C. § 2201.
26 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2) .
27 For a description of the presidential records preservation system see infra notes 164-76
and accompanying text.
28 Armstrong I, 924 F.2d 282, 290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("We therefore hold that the PRA
precludes judicial review of the President's recordkeeping practices and decisions."). The guide-
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decision of the President or presidential library about the release of a
presidential document has no recourse in the courts.'" Although access
to presidential records can also be obtained through FOIA, there is a
delay of at least five years placed on their release, with the possibility
of an additional seven-year delay in the event that the President decides
that a document falls within one of the restricted categories." Thus, a
document's designation (federal, presidential, or non-record) carries
with it a myriad of legal consequences regarding whether the docu-
ment gets preserved, and if it does, the manner of that document's
preservation, the likelihood of its timely release to the public, and the
ability of an aggrieved citizen to seek help from the courts in obtaining
access to a particular record.'l
In August of 1993, in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
determined that certain electronic mail tapes at issue are in fact gov-
ernment records, rather than merely "extra copies" of which the Ex-
ecutive Office can dispose." In finding that the tapes contain federal
and presidential records, however, the court did not provide a way to
decide into which category an individual record falls." Instead, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court, which asked
the defendants to create guidelines to govern the disposal of the
lines that define what will he treated as a presidential record, however, are judicially reviewable.
Armstrong 11, I F.3d 1274, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Thus, although the PRA impliedly precludes
judicial review of the President's decisions concerning the creation, management, and disposal
of presidential records during his term of office, [citing Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290-91], the
courts may review guidelines outlining what is, and what is not, a 'presidential record' to ensure
that materials that are not subject to the PRA are not treated as presidential records.").
29 See id.
30 44 U.S.C. § 2204. These restricted categories cover documents that are: 1) classified (die
classification must be both proper and authorized by specific criteria established pursuant to an
Executive order); 2) related to appointments to federal office; 3) exempted from disclosure by
statute (as long as the statute is specific about what material must he withheld, and there is no
discretion in the statute regarding the disclosure); 4) trade and commercial secrets, or privileged
financial information; 5) confidential communications requesting or submitting advice, between
the President and his advisors, or between such advisors; or 6) personnel, medical, or other files,
the disclosure of which would constitute a violation of privacy. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a) (1)—(6).
31 See infra notes 168-76, 200-21 and accompanying text.
32 See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1283 ("To qualify as a record tinder the ERA, a document must
satisfy a two-pronged test. It must be (1) 'made or received by an agency of the United States
Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business' and (2)
'preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency as evidence of the organization,
fianctions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or
because of the informational value of the data in [it]' 
	 having established that the electronic
communications systems contain preservable records 
	 " (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3301)). Thus, the
Government's argument that the documents were non-records (extra copies) failed, Id.
33 See id, at 1294-97.
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records and distinguish between the two types of documents. 34 Once
the court approves guidelines, they apply to the records at issue in the
case." If they are found to be federal records, the court can then move
on to the plaintiff's FOIA claim." If the documents are found to be
presidential records, the Archivist will take control of them and the
President will be able to place a twelve-year restriction on many of
them. 37
 Thus, at this juncture, the prospect that the plaintiffs will
obtain the release of the documents within the next decade depends
on the courts' answer to one question: are the NSC electronic mail
documents at issue in the case "federal records" or "presidential re-
cords"?"
This Note argues that the NSC is really made up of three units,
the National Security Advisor, the National Security Council and the
staff of the National Security Council. Although the first two can be
excluded from the FRA as non-agencies because they exist solely to
advise and assist the President, the NSC Staff functions as an agency
of the United States government, thereby creating agency records
subject to all the provisions of the FRA and FOIA." Section 1 of this
Note examines the structure, creation and development of the Execu-
" Id. at 1296-97; see Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 763
(D.D.C. 1993). Despite its earlier concession that the NSC creates both presidential and federal
records, and despite the fact that the NSC has complied—at least in part—with FOIA since 1975,
the government, in a brief submitted to the district court on March 25, 1994, argued that the
NSC exists "solely" to advise and assist the ('resident and therefore creates only presidential
records; and that therefore, the NSC is not subject at all to the FRA. Defendant's March 25, 1994,
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142).
35
 See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1296.
38 See id.
37 See hi. The PRA permits a tewlvc.year restriction on disclosure of documents deemed to
be "confidential communications requesting or submitting advice, between the President and his
advisors, or between such advisors." 44 U.S.C. § 2202(a) (5).
se See infra notes 449-66 and accompanying text for an analysis of this question.
39 Courts have used the term "agency record" when describing documents subject to FOIA.
See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980); Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1984). When discussing documents subject to the FRA,
courts have used the term "federal records." See, e.g., Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1278; American
Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Because FOIA and the FRA
cover documents created or received by an "agency," for the purposes of this Note there is no
real distinction between "federal records" and "agency records." See 5 U.S.C. § 552; 44 U.S.C.
§ 3301. There is some indication, however, that FOIA may cover a larger set of records than are
covered by the FRA. United States Dep't ofjustice, FOIA Counselor: What is an 'Agency Record'?,
FOIA Update, Fall 1980, at 5 ( — Records' is not a statutorily defined term in FOIA. In fart it
appears that the only definition of this term in the U.S. Code is that in the Federal Records
Act.. . . As used in FOIA the term [records] generally includes everything mentioned in [the
MA] definition.") For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that whatever documents are
deemed to he federal records in the Armstrong case will also fall within the scope of FOIA.
September 1094]	 PUBLIC ACCESS 7'0 NSC RECORDS	 1151
tive Office of the President ("EOP"), the position of National Security
Advisor ("NSA"), and the National Security Counsel and its staff. 4°
Section II describes the language and legislative history of the various
statutes that govern executive branch records and their management,
preservation and treatment, including the PRA, the FRA and FOIA. 4 '
Section III looks to judicial handling of "agency" and "agency records"
cases.42 Section IV presents the facts and proceedings in Armstrong and
the determinations made by the district and circuit courts.° Finally,
Section V applies the statutes and cases, and their underlying policies,
to the facts of Armstrong and concludes that the NSC records at issue
in the case, and all future records created by and within the control
of the NSC Staff, should be designated agency records, but those
records created by the Council or the National Security Advisor should
be considered presidential records."
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EOP, NSA ANn NSC
A. Executive Office of the President and the National Security Advisor
The executive branch of the United States government, created
under Article II of the United States Constitution and headed by the
President, currently employs over two million people. 15 The majority
of those employees work in executive departments, such as the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Education or the Department of
Labor.'"' At the head of this vast bureaucracy is an entity called the
Executive Office of the President ("EOP")." The most important unit
of the EOP is the White House Office, sometimes referred to as the
10 See infra notes 45-127 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 128-221 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 222-325 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 326-77 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 378-472 and accompanying text.
45 U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in the President of the United
States of America"); Orrtc or MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET oF THE UNITED STATICS
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1994, 39 [hereinafter litmc.rr, IF/sCAL YEAR 1994] (Executive Branch
Civilian Employment—All agencies except Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission, Actual as
of September 50, 1992: 2,227,709).
46 !able: Federal Employment in the Executive Branch, in BulOcl ET, FISCAL YEAR 1994, supra note
45, at 31.3. Another huge component of executive branch employees work for independent
establishments and government corporations, such as the Agency for Inters1;1001ml Development,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Id.; NATIONAL. ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, TIE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MANUAL 1093/1994, at 21 [hereinafter GOVERNMENT MANUAL].
47 GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 46, at 21. The Executive Office of the President (EOP)
currently has 10 units:
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"Staff of the President" because it consists of the President's closest
administrators, counselors, assistants and deputy assistants, who serve
the President in the "activities incident to his immediate office."48
 The
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ("National Se-
curity Advisor" or "NSA") and his or her Deputy are members of the
White House Office." In fact, these two staff members make up a still
smaller entity, a sub-unit of the White House Office, which is referred
to as the Office for National Security Affairs." The White House Office,
however, is only one unit of the EOP. 5'
B. The National Security Council
1. Structure
Another unit of the EOP is the National Security Council, located
in the Old Executive Office Building. 52
 Structurally, the NSC has two
units: the National Security Council itself ("the Council") and its per-
manent staff ("the Staff')." Currently, the Council has four members,
White House Office
Office of Management and Budget
Council of Economic Advisors
National Security Council
Office of the United States Trade Representative
Council on Environmental Quality
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of National Drug Control Policy
National Critical Materials Council
Office of Administration
Id. at 91-104.
48 See id. at 94. For a list of the members of the White House Office, see GOVERNMENT
MANUAL, supra note 46, at 93-94.
49 Id. at 93. The current NSA is Anthony Lake and his deputy is Samuel Berger. Id.
5° See 1991 FEDERAL. STAIT DIRECTORY 6 (Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991).
51
 GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 46, at 91-104. Under the authority of the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1939, numerous agencies were transferred to the EOP. Id. at 91 (citing 5 U.S.C.
133-133r, I33t note). This act was followed by an executive order that established the divisions
of the Executive Office and defined their functions. Id. (citing Executive Order No. 8248, 5 C.F.R.
1303.2 (1939)).
52 Id. at 98. The Council was placed in the EOP under the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of
1949. Id. at 98 (citing 5 U.S.C. app. § 903); 1991 FEDERAL. STAFF DIRECTORY, supra note 50, at
20-21. During the Bush Administration, the NSA, Deputy NSA and their assistants, as well as the
Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC and their assistants, and the
White House Situation Support Staff had their offices at the White House. Id. All other members
of the NSC Staff had their offices at the Old Executive Office Building. Id. Although the NSC is
a part of the EOP, it has a separate e-mail system from the other EOP units. Armstrong II, I F.3d
1274, 1279 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
55 See CHRISTOPHER C. SHOEMAKER, THE NSC STAFF. COUNSELING THE COUNCIL 23 (1991).
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two statutory advisors, five standing participants and four officials. 54
The NSA is considered both a standing participant and an official of
the NSC." The statutory role of the Council is to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military poli-
cies relating to national security, in order to increase the effectiveness
of other governmental organizations in handling matters of national
security." The influence and importance of the Council waxes and
wanes with each President and his desire to use the Council as a forum
for national security deliberations and decisions. 57 All the members,
advisors and participants of the Council serve on it by virtue of a
position of responsibility they hold separate from the NSC itself. 5R
Thus, the Council is only as strong as the persons serving on it and
the President's desire to make use of it."
51 GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 46, at 98. The four current members of the Council
are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. hi. The statutory
advisors arc the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the JoMt Chiefs of Staff
Id. The shuttling participants are the Secretary of the Treasury, the U,S. Representative to the
United Nations, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (NSA), and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. Id. The officials
of the NSC are the Assistant to the President for National Security Afbirs, his deputy, the Special
Assistant to the President and Staff Director, and the Executive Secretary. Id. Thus, the NSA is
both a standing participant and an official of the NSC. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 46, at
98. lie is the only person to hold two positions. See id.
Section 402 of Title 50 of the United States Code lays out the composition of the Council:
the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director for Mutual
Security, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. 50 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1)—(6)
(1988). The statute provides that Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive depart-
ments and military departments may serve on the Council at the President's invitation. 50 U.S.C.
§ 402(a) (7). The statute further provides that the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Director of National Drug Policy, and the Director of Central Intelligence may attend
and participate in the meetings of the NSG at the direction of the President. 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 402(e)—(f), (h) (West 1991 & Stipp. 1994).
"GOVERNMENT MANUAL, Supra note 46, at 98.
5 50 U.S.C. § 402(a). The Tower Commission Report on the Iran-Contra Affair explains that
the !hive tools available to the President in providing leadership and direction to the bureauc-
racies that execute national security policy arc: 1) the National Security Council, 2) the National
Security Advisor and 3) the National Security Staff. Tower Commission Report, reprinted in THE
ToWER COMMISSION REPORT 87 (Bantam Books 1987).
57 See infra notes 76-127 and accompanying text; see also Suommuat, supra note 53, at 21.
For a full discussion of NSC decision-making, see generally Kam. F. INDEREURTH & LOCH K.
joEiNsoN, DECISIONS OF THE HIGHEST ORDER: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUN-
CIL (1988). See also CARNES LORD, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MANAGEMENT Or NATIONAL SECU-
RITY (1988).
58 GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 46, at 98. For example, the Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense and Secretary of the Treasury head their own executive departments. Id. at 428, 476,
484. The Chief of Staff, NSA and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy all serve on the
President's staff in the White House Office. Id. at 93-94, 98.
"See SHOEMAKER, StipTa note 53, at 21.
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In contrast, the NSC Staff has assumed increasing responsibilities
over the past forty years. 6° The role of the Staff is more constant than
that of the Council, and less dependent on the President's personality
and decision making style; it is the Staff that guides and supports the
Council in carrying out the performance of its functions (both primary
and "additional") . 6 ' These "additional" functions include assessing and
appraising the country's objectives, commitments and risks in the area
of national security, and evaluating their relation to our actual and
potential military power, for the purpose of making recommendations
to the President."' Although the Council may make the ultimate deci-
sion, the bulk of the oversight and evaluation is done by Staff members
who prepare reports for those who serve on the Council. 63 The NSC,
and thus, the NSC Staff, must also consider national policies that affect
the "common interest" of the departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment concerned with national security in order to provide the
Council with the information necessary to make recommendations to
the President." In addition, the Staff assists the Council in meeting its
duty to make whatever recommendations or produce whatever reports
the President may request. 65 The statute creating the Council also
provides for a civilian executive secretary to head the NSC Staff. 66 That
person is appointed by the President, and is authorized, subject to the
direction of the Council, to hire the personnel necessary to fulfill "such
duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the
performance of its functions."67
The duties of the NSC Staff also require activity outside the confines
of the NSC itself, for it is the responsibility of the NSC Staff to ensure
that the President's and the Council's national security decisions are,
in fact, implemented. 68
 In addition, the Staff is charged with "coordi-
nating" the operations of the agencies connected with national secu-
66 /d. at 21-23 ("The NSC Staff . . . is an institutional body that has assumed mounting
importance over the past forty years. Unlike its parent organization, the Staff must perform
several critical functions that are driven largely by the diverse nature of the international envi-
ronment and are generally independent of the psychology of the President himsell:"). Shoemaker
lists seven functional requisites of the NSC Staff: 1) administration, 2) policy coordination and
integration, 3) policy supervision, 4) policy adjudication, 5) crisis management, 6) policy formu-
lation and 7) policy advocacy. Id. at 22. He also notes that the degree of controversy varies with
the function, with (1) being the least controversial and (7) being the most controversial. Id.
"I Id. at 21-23; see 50 U.S.C. § 402(c).
52 50	 § 402(6) (1).
63 1,ORD, MOM note 57, at 117; SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 20-22.
64 50 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2).
65 50 U.S.C. § 402(d).
66 50 U.S.C. § 402(c); INDERFURTH 8C JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 140.
67 50 U.S.C. § 402(c).
11" Presidential Decision Directive 2, at 1 (Jan. 20,1993) (I -Me NSC shall he [the Presi-
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rity.'"' There have even been instances in which the NSC Staff has
engaged in the actual carrying out of covert operations, a role the Staff'
continues to retain." That role, however, is limited by statutes that
require a presidential finding and disclosure of the operation to Con-
gress. 7 '
The task of integrating United States national security policy spans
four major areas of concern: defense policy, foreign policy, intelligence
policy and economic policy. 72 The President's focus during any given
period may shift from one of these areas to another." However, the
three instruments for ensuring implementation of the President's ideas
have been in place for over three decades: the National Security Advi-
sor, the National Security Council, and the NSC Staff. 7'' In order to
better understand their current. role, it is essential to look at the
development of these three entities, from their births in the beginning
of this century to their roles as we move into the next."
2. History
Prior to the end of World War 11, the military treated the area of
national security as its exclusive domain." Lack of coordination among
the different branches of the vast defense and foreign policy estab-
lishments demonstrated a need for a coordinating structure. 77 As early
as World War 1, various forces within the upper levels of government
attempted to create a body that would guide foreign policy and provide
for "political-military consultation" on foreign policy. 78 Precursors to
the NSC included the Joint State-Navy Neutrality Board (1919), the
dent's] principle means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development
and implementation of national security policy."), reprinted in Defendants' Appendix of Exhibits
in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, fOr Summary Judgment on the National
Security Council Itecordkeeping Claims, ex. 17, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No.
89-142).
69 Id.
"See infra notes 109-16 for a discussion of the Iran-Contra affair.
71 Id.
72 See SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 5; see also 50 U.S.C. § 402(a). Shoemaker provides the
following definition for the term "National Security": "the protection of the United States from
major threats to our territorial, political or economic well-being." SHOEMAKER, supra note 53,
at 5.
73 See SHOEMAKER, SUPRA supra note 53, at 76. For example, recent events in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere have demonstrated the increased importance of economic policy to national
security concerns. Id.
74 See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (enacted in 1947); see also Lotus, supra note 57, at 35.
75 See infra notes 76-127 and accompanying text for a history of the NSC.
76 See SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 4.
77 1xtbilueuirru & JOHNSON, supra note 57, at I,
79 Id. at 2.
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Standing Liaison Committee (1940) and the State-War-Navy Coordi-
nating Committee (1945). 7° Each of these bodies ultimately failed due
to a lack of authority to make policy decisions and an inability to
examine questions not referred to it by other departments."
In 1947, extensive negotiations between the military departments,
the executive branch, and Congress, resulted in the enactment of the
National Security Act. 8 ' The primary purpose of the National Secu-
rity Act was to increase efficiency within the national security estab-
lishment.82
 Thus, one of the major achievements of the Act was the
consolidation of the departments of the Army and Navy into a single
unit, the Department of Defense." Another achievement was the es-
tablishment of a permanent entity, known as the National Security
Council, to coordinate all national security efforts within the various
branches of the United States government.84
Although created in 1947, the NSC did not immediately assume
a prominent role in national security affairs." President Truman ex-
pressed skepticism of the NSC and its potential to undercut his author-
ity and independence in foreign and military policy decision making."
In order to prevent the NSC from taking a commanding role in
national security decisions, he rarely attended meetings. 87
 Thus, in its
formative years, the NSC served more as a forum for department heads
to meet and find common ground than as a body to establish United
States policy. 88
President Eisenhower's military background led him to place more
emphasis on formal decision-making processes, thereby creating a
greater substantive role for the NSC in U.S. policy-making." Eisen-
hower created the position of Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (now known as the "National Security Advisor" or
"NSA"), and appointed Robert Culter to the post." Under Eisenhower,
79
 Ernest R. May, The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States, in
INDERFURTH & JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 8- 14.
See id. at 13.
81 SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 8; Alfred D. Sander, Truman and the National Security
Council: 1945-1947, in INDERFURTH & JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 24; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-32.
82 See 50 U.S.C. § 401.
83 See id.; SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 8.
84 See 50 U.S.C. § 402(a).
85 See SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 10-16; Sander, supra note 81, at 27.
86 SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 10; Sander, supra note 81, at 27.
87 SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 10.
gEl See id.
89 Id. at 11-13 ("(Ti he President himself chaired more than 90 percent of the NSC meetings
and made decisions at these meetings.").
99 INDERFURTH & JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 140-41; SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 11-12.
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the NSA served as the principle executive officer of the Council,
handling the agenda, briefings and staff supervision. 9 ' The NSA was
not a policy advocate. 92 In March, 1953, Cutter established a plan for
formalized decision making that increased the NSC's influence in
policy creation and development." In addition, President Eisenhower's
attendance at over ninety percent of the NSC meetings "infused a new
sense of purpose and importance in the NSC process.'" The emphasis
placed on consensus during the Eisenhower years, however, prompted
criticism of the NSC as a forum in which watered down, compromise
solutions to national security problems were adopted. 95
Executive Secretaries:
Truman Administration
Sidney W. Souers, 1947-195(1
James S. Lay, Jr., 1950-1953
Assistants for National Security Affairs:
Eisenhower Administration
Robert Cutler, 1953-1955
Dillon Anderson, 1955-1956
William Jackson, 1956
Robert Cutler, 1957-1958
Gordon Gray, 1958-1961
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
McGeorge Bundy, 1961-1966
Walt W. Rostow, 1966-1969
Nixon and Ford Administrations
Henry A. Kissinger, 1969-1975
Brent Scowcroft, 1975-1977
Carter Administration
Zhigniew Brzezinski, 1977-1981
Reagan Administration
Richard V. Allen, 1981-1982
William P. Clark, 1982-1983
Robert C. McFarlane, 1983-1985
,fohn M. Poindexter, 1985-1986
Frank C. Carlucci, 1987
Colin L. Powell, 1987-1988
Bush Administration
Brent Scowcroft, 1988-1993
Clinton Administration
Anthony Lake, 1993-1994
INDERFURTH & JOHNSON, .supra note 57, it 141; 1991 FEDERAL STAFF DIRECTORY, supra note 50,
at 20; GOVERNMENT MANUAL., Stipra nOte 46, at 98.
9i Tower Commission Report, supra note 56, at 8.
92 Id.
93 S OEMA KER, supra note 53, at 12-13.
94 Id. at 13.
95j
	 Cutler, Early Years, in INDERFURTH & JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 46.
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President Kennedy reversed this trend toward formalized deci-
sion-making and expansion of the NSC's role." The NSC fell into
disuse for two reasons. 97 One was President Kennedy's preference for
centralized, informal decision-making." The other was the report of
the Jackson Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, which criti-
cized the Eisenhower NSC for its failure to help resolve serious prob-
lems of national security In contrast to the Council's loss of stature,
the NSA acquired the influential role of personal advisor to the Presi-
dent on national security affairs.'°° President Johnson, who held his
major foreign policy meetings as an informal "Tuesday Luncheon
Group" of trusted advisors, also chose not to make use of the NSC. 1 ° 1
The fortunes of the NSC again changed when President Nixon
took office. 102 His National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, used the
NSC as a mechanism to acquire virtually complete control of United
States foreign policy.t°3 Not only was Kissinger a policy advisor, but he
also became a negotiator and spokesman for the Nixon Administra-
tion, duties traditionally performed by the State Departrnent. 1 °4 Gradu-
ally, Kissinger, and later Brzezinski under the Carter Administration,
wrested power from the State Department and Department of Defense,
and centralized it in the White House through the NSC.'° 5 Although
Kissinger eventually held both the NSA position and the position of
Secretary of State, he continued to use the NSC and its staff to carry
out his policies and missions. ] °6 Thus, the NSC's elaborate bureaucratic
mechanism sustained both Kissinger's and Brezinski's hold on power.'"
Under Kissinger, the NSC expanded in size to its all-time high of fifty
professional and eighty support personnel. 105
During the Reagan era, the NSC, while maintaining its size, ex-
panded its activities.m° Seeking to remain informed of covert opera-
96 SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 14.
97 Id.
" Id.
R Id.; see also Tile NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: JACKSON SUBCOMMITTEE PAPERS ON POL-
ICY-MAKING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL. 7-8 (Henry M. Jackson ed., 1965).
100 Tower Commission Report, supra note 56, at 8.
I61 SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 15.
1 °2
 See id. at 16.
I" See id. at 17-18. For a full discussion of the NSC during the Nixon and Carter years, see
generally GERRY ARGYRIS ANDRIANOPOuLoS, KISSINGER AND BRZEZINSKI: THE NSC AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF US NATIONAL POLICY (1991).
Im Tower Commission Report, supra note 56, at 9.
1115 SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 18.
m6 Id.
1 °1 Id.; McGeorge Bundy, Transformation, iu 1NDERFURTH & JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 95-98.
"Bundy, supra note 107, at 94.
I ' ." Id. at 102.
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tions, Congress, in 1974, adopted the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which
instructed the President to inform Congress, in a timely manner, of
any covert intelligence activities.' w Because the Reagan Administration
interpreted the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to apply only to the CIA,
the NSC under Reagan carried out its own covert actions, thereby
avoiding the reporting requirement."' Thus, the NSC moved from
policy-making, advocacy, coordination, and implementation, to active
engagement in covert operations." 2 However, these covert activities
violated a different law, the Boland Amendment, which forbade federal
funding of the Nicaraguan Contras."5 These covert funding activities
eventually resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal." 4 As a result, the Ad-
ministration quickly moved to reign in the NSC Staff." 5 In his March
31, 1987, National Security Decision, Directive Number 266, President
Reagan asserted that since Iran-Contra, the NSC Staff had been "re-
built" and "made subject to proper management discipline. "116
Aware that executive orders can be changed at the will of the
President, Congress codified many of the recommendations of the
Senate and House committees that investigated the Iran-Contra scan-
dal.''' The new rules, part of the Intelligence Authorization Bill of
1991, prohibit the expenditure of federal funds on covert action by
any entity of the executive branch without a signed, written finding by
110 50 U.S.C. § 413 ("['The heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the
United States involved in intelligence activities shall—(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives .. fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities ... (a) report in a
timely fashion to the intelligence committees [of Congress] any illegal intelligence activity ....").
III See Tower Commission Report, supra note 56, app. 11 at 66 (Feb. 18, 1987, letter from
Edwin Meese, Attorney General, to John Tower, President's Special Review Board, explaining his
position on the Hughes-Ryan Amendment: if one assumes that. the CIA assisted in the covert
operations in question, and if one further assumes that the goal of the transfer was to influence
a foreign government without public disclosure, then the Hughes-Ryan Amendment did apply
to the transfer of arms to Iran that was the subject of the Iran-Contra scandal.); George Lardner,
Jr., Covert Ads Restricted Under Part; Bill Would Codify 'Lessons Learned' From Iran Contra, WASH.
POST, July 27, 1991, at Al.
1 12 Tower Commission Report, supra note 56, at 55-61.
1111 For a full discussion of the Boland Amendments, see generally Frank G. Colella, Note,
Beyond Institutional Competence: Congressional Efforts to Legislate United States Foreign Policy To-
ward Nicaragua—The Boland Amendments, 54 Blume. L. Rev. 131 (1988).
I' Tower Commission Report, supra note 56, at 1.
115 PUBLIC PAPERS OF	 PResnulsrrs oi"rne. UNITED STATES: RONA 1.1) REAGAN (United
States Government Printing Office, Vol. No, 1, 1989) at 310-11 ("'Phis directive mandates certain
actions to put the National Security Council (NSC) process in better order and to avoid any
recurrence of the deficiencies and abuses that the Special Review Board described. Many of these
remedial measures—including the prohibition of NSC Staff engagement in covert activities—were
implemented before the Special Review Board reported to me on February 26.").
116 National Security Decision, Directive No, 266 (Mar, 31, 1987).
117 59 U.S.C.A. § 413-14 (West. Stipp. 1993); Lordlier, supra note 111, at Al.
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the President." 8
 The new rules further require the President to notify
Congress of any covert actions or findings within forty-eight hours of
commencement, and prohibit the President from retroactively author-
izing covert actions."' They also require the President to notify Con-
gress when other countries or private individuals will be used to finance
or engage in covert activity "in any significant way." 12° These new rules
do not prevent the NSC from engaging in covert operations; they
merely require presidential approval and congressional notification. 12 '
Although it is too early to predict what influence the NSC will have
during the Clinton Presidency, a recent profile of Clinton's National
Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, gives some indication that the NSC
will seek a cooperative, policy oversight role more akin to the NSC of
the Eisenhower period than that of the Nixon or Reagan years.' 22 In
an interview with the Washington Post, Mr. Lake pointed out that
unlike the Kissinger and Brzezinski eras, when the NSC battled with
the Department of State and others for control over foreign policy, his
NSC has worked in concert with the Department of State in recent
missions to Europe regarding cooperation in the effort to stop the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.' 28
 Thus, Clinton's NSA continues, in the tradi-
tion of its predecessors, to tailor its role to the style of the President
and his conception of the proper role for an NSA.' 24
The history of the NSA, the National Security Council, and the
NSC Staff demonstrate the fluidity of executive power. 125 It is virtually
impossible to determine from one administration to the next what
responsibilities the NSA will choose, or be asked to assume.' 28 There is
little doubt, however, that the NSC Staff will continue to fulfill its role
of evaluating national security policy, coordinating its implementation,
118 50 U.S.C.A. § 413b (West Stipp. 1993). Covert action is defined as activity of the Govern-
ment "to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that
the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly .. .."
50 U.S.C.A. § 413b(e). Traditional "counterintelligence activities," "diplomatic or military activi-
ties," and "law enforcement activities" arc exempted. 50 U.S.C.A. § 41 3b(e)(1)—(3).
119 50 U.S.C.A. § 415h(a)(1)—(2).
12°50 U.S.C.A. § 41313(a) (4).
121 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 4131s.
P12 See Ruth Marcus, Anthony Lake's Secretive Mission; He Wants to Help Shape U.S. Foreign
Policy and Avoid the Spotlight. So Far, He's Succeeded, WASH. Pos•, Dec. 20, 1993, at Dl.
123 Id.
124 See id.
12.5 LORD, supra note 57, at 148.
126
 See id.
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and providing assistance, information, and guidance to the NSA and
all the members of the Council.' 27
III. THE STATUTES GOVERNING GOVERNMENT RECORDS
A. Presidential Records
Historically, presidential papers were treated as the property of the
President.' 28 This private ownership principle hindered the complete-
ness of presidential records collections and hampered the ability of the
public to examine them.' 29 It was not until President Franklin Roosevelt
created the first presidential library that presidential papers were con-
served and made accessible to the public in a comprehensive man-
ner.'" All presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan now
have libraries dedicated to preserving their papers for historical and
other purposes." All these efforts, however, have been voluntary, and
have depended on the good will of the individual President.'"
1. The Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act
It was a political crisis that brought about direct congressional
involvement in the preservation of presidential records.'" In 1975, the
Watergate scandal erupted, when it became public knowledge that
members of the Nixon Administration directed the burglary of the
offices of the Democratic Party, located at the Watergate complex in
Washington, D.C. 134 As the press followed the trail of knowledge up the
ranks of the executive branch, President Nixon sought to cover up his
127 See id. at 147-.49; see also SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 72.
125 For a full discussion of the history of presidential papers, see Carl McGowan, Presidents
and Their Papers, 68 MINN. L. REV. 409, 413 (1992).
12<r
1 " Id. at 415.
151 id. at 414 & n.34. With the exception of the Nixon library, all presidential libraries arc
under the auspices of the National Archives and Records Administration.
in H.R. REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732,
5733.
153 ,See Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), Pub. L. No. 93-526,
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1950, 88 Stat. 1695; H.R. REP. No. 1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974)
("[T]his information is necessary to . . . provide the American people with a complete and
accurate account of 'Watergate.'").
134 Lawrence Meyer, The Prosecutors: From a "Third -Rate Burglary" to "The Saturday Night
Massacre, "in THE FALL OF A PRESIDENT 66 (Washington Post ed., 1974). For a detailed chronology
of Watergate, see generally WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS (Congressional Quarterly,
1975).
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involvement.' 35
 He fought to avoid surrendering the recordings of oval
office conversations made by a voice activated recording system that
he had installed.'" When that effort failed, he devised an agreement
with the Administrator of General Services which would have permit-
ted the destruction or permanent suppression of the Watergate tapes.'"
This agreement led to the enactment of two pieces of legislation.' 38
The first, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act
("PRMPA") applied only to the Watergate tapes.'" Under the PRMPA,
Congress took control of approximately 42 million pages of documents
and 880 tape recordings, which contained both personal and non-per-
sonal records.' 40
 The President challenged the constitutionality of the
PRMPA, alleging that it violated separation of powers and the Presi-
dent's executive privilege."' The United States Supreme Court found
the PRMPA to be constitutional. 192
 Thus, the Supreme Court upheld
Congress' right to remove control of presidential records from the
President and provide for their preservation and management by an-
other executive branch official. 143
2. The Presidential Records Act
The second piece of legislation stemming from Watergate, the
Presidential Records Act, sought to accomplish the same things as the
PRMPA, but applied prospectively rather than retroactively.'" The PRA
had three major goals: (1) to define and declare public ownership of
presidential records, (2) to create management procedures for those
135 Meyer, Supra note 134, at 74. For a gripping account of the Watergate story, see generally
BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENTS MEN (1974).
136 See Nixon v. United Stales, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
137 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 331 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 433
U.S. 425 (1978). For the full text of the agreement, see the Appendix to H.R. REP. No. 1507, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1974).
198 Pub. L. No. 93-526, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1950, 88 Stat. 1695; Presidential Records
Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-07 (1988).
119
 Pub. L. No. 93-526, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1950, 88 Stat. 1695. The PRMPA applies to
"all original tape recordings of conversations ... recorded by any officer or employee of the
Federal Government . . . in the White House or in the Office of the President . . . during the
period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974." Id. at § 101(a).
140
 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 430 (1977); see also Nixon v.
United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (which held that President Nixon is entitled
to compensation for the "taking" of his property by Congress when it enacted the PRMPA).
141
 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Stipp. at 329.
142 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 484.
143 See id.
141 The Presidential Records Act, Pub. L. No. 95-591, § 3 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2201)
(effective January 20, 1981); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 132, at 5734.
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records both during and after a President's term, and (3) to create a
system of public access to those records. 15
 The first of these goals was
met by an elaborate definition of what is, and what is not, a presidential
record.'"
a. Definition of a Presidential Record
The PRA applies to all "documentary materials" 147 created or re-
ceived after January 20, 1981, by the President, his immediate staff, or
a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose
function is to advise and assist the President, if those documents are
created or received in the course of conducting activities that relate to
or affect the carrying out of the duties of the President.'" The PRA
does not cover personal records.'" Also excluded from its coverage are
stocks of publications and stationery, or extra copies that are "pro-
duced only for convenience of reference" and clearly marked as such.'"
The PRA does not cover documentary materials that fall under the
scope of the Federal Records Acts.' 5 '
Thus, to qualify for treatment under the PRA, a document must
meet two criteria. 152
 First, it must be created or received by an individ-
ual or entity covered by the Act.'" These include the President, his
immediate staff and units of the EOP that advise and assist the Presi-
dent. 154
 Second, the document must be created or received for a pur-
pose covered by the PRA.'" Thus, documents created or received in
the course of conducting activities that relate to or have an effect upon
the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official duties
115 44 U.S.C. § 2201.
146 Id.
147 44 U.S.C. at §§ 2201-07. "The term 'documentary materials' means all books, correspon-
dence, memorandums, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art, models, pictures, photo-
graphs, plats, maps, films, and motion pictures, including, but not limited to, audio, audio-visual,
or other electronic or mechanical recordations," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(l).
115 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2).
149 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B). "The term 'personal records' means all documentary materials,
or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, of a purely private or non-public character which
do not relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the duties of the President" 44 U.S.C.
§ 2201(3).
150 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B) (stating exceptions to PRA).
151
 Id. The PRA "does not include any documentary materials that. are (i) official records of
an agency (as defined in section 552(e) of Title 5, United States Code)." Id.
155
 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2).
155 1d.
tr,i
155 Id.
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of the President fall within the scope of the PRA.'" In addition, the
PRA includes documents relating to the political activities of the Presi-
dent, if they also relate to the carrying out of his constitutional, statu-
tory, or other official duties.' 57
Three groups of documents are excluded from the PRA.'" First,
records created for reasons other than the carrying out of the Presi-
dent's duties may be termed personal records and excluded from
coverage under the PRA.'" These "personal records" are those of a
purely private or non-public character.' Second, "agency records" are
excluded from the PRA because they are covered by the FRA. 16' Finally,
stocks of publications and stationery, and extra copies of documents
are excluded.' 62 This third group of records is excluded from coverage
because of a lack of informational or historical value.' 65
b. Management of Presidential Records
Having declared that presidential records belong to the United
States and having defined what qualifies as a presidential record, the
PRA then created a system of management of, and access to, those
records.' 64 Under the statute, when an incumbent President seeks to
dispose of presidential records which no longer have "administrative,
historical, informational, or evidentiary value," he or she must obtain
the written views of the Archivist and assurances from the Archivist that
he or she does not intend to take any action to prevent the destruc-
tion.' 65 The President must then submit disposal schedules to Congress
and wait sixty calendar days of continuous session before destroying
5i; a
157 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2) (A).
158 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2) (B).
194 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3).
111' Id. The statute describes some categories of personal records:
(A) diaries, journals or other personal notes serving as the equivalent of a diary
or journal, which are not used in conducting government business;
(B) materials relating to private political associations, as long as they have no
effect on the carrying out of presidential duties; and
(C) materials relating to the President's own election to office or relating to the
election of another individual, as long as they do not relate to the carrying out of
the President's duties.
44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(A)—(C).
1111 See 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(3)(i),
1112 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2)(B) (iii)—(iv).
163 See id.; 44 U.S.C. § 2201(d).
"44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-04.
165 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)(1)—(2).
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the documents. 166 If the Archivist determines that the records to be
destroyed are of particular interest to Congress, or that congressional
consultation is in the public interest, then the Archivist must request
the advice of numerous congressional committees regarding the dis-
posal.'"
c. Access to Presidential Records
Finally, the PRA provides for access to the records. 1  Once a
President has left office, all presidential records created during his or
her term are turned over to the National Archives and placed in
presidential libraries.'' 9 The function of the presidential libraries is to
make records available to researchers, upon request and on an "impar-
tial basis." 17" Once the Archivist has taken control, he or she, exclu-
sively, may make disposal decisions, provided that disposal schedules
are printed in the Federal Register at least sixty days before the pro-
posed disposal date.' 7 ' Significant control remains, however, with the
President's ability to prevent release of any record for a period of
twelve years if he or she deems the record to fall into one of the
exempted categories. 171
Thus, Congress met its goals of preservation and access, but did
so in a way inoffensive to separation of powers.'" The Archivist is an
executive branch official appointed by the President, so Congress left
control of the records within the power of the executive branch.' 74 The
PRA was merely an addition to an already extensive set of statutes that
governed the records created by entities within the White House.'"
166 44 U.S.C. § 2203(d).
167 44 U.S.C. § 2203(e).
168 44 U.S.C. § 2204.
169 See 44 U.S.C. § 2203(1).
176 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 132, at 3.
171 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f) (3).
172 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (allows the President to restrict access to any record for up to twelve
years if the records relate to appointments, are classified, contain trade secrets or contain
"confidential communications requesting or submitting advice, between the President and his
advisors") .
17s
	 v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,444-46 (1977); see also Carl Bretscher,
Note, The President and Judicial Review Under the Records Acts, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 1477,1483
(1992).
174 Bretscher, .supra note 173, at 1483.
176 See infra notes 178-221 for a discussion of the Federal Records Acts ("FRA").
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The vast majority of White House records were already covered under
the Federal Records Acts.'"
B. Federal (Agency) Records
1. The Federal Records Acts
While President Franklin Roosevelt was addressing concerns about
presidential records by creating the first presidential library, Congress
acted to protect the records of the Federal Government in general.'"
As the size and scope of the executive branch expanded, so did the
quantity of federal records.'" Between 1957 and 1979, the quantity of
federal records rose steadily, from 23.5 million cubic feet in 1957 to
35.7 million cubic feet in 1979. 17° Concerns about institutional mem-
ory, as well as the importance of the nation's historical legacy, led
Congress to enact the 1943 Disposal of Records Act and the Federal
Records Act of 1950.' 8° Congress later amended these statutes, now
referred to as the Federal Records Acts."' The FRA's purpose is to
provide for efficient government and to allow private researchers and
those whose rights may have been affected by actions of government
to access federal records.' 82
Similar to the PRA, the FRA sets up methods of managing, pre-
serving and disposing of federal records, as necessary to achieve its
176m
177 Id.
I 78 McGowan, supra note 128, at 414; GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL AR-
CHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, Pub. No. 7610-01-055-8704; RECORDS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK,
DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL. RECORDS, Figure 2, at 3 (1981) (on file with the Boston College Law
Review).
179 DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL RECORDS, supra note 178, at 3.
' 8°Pub. L. No. 754-849, 64 Stat. 583 (1951); Pub. L. No. 115-192 (1943).
181 See supra note 18. For purposes of the FRA, the term "records" is defined to include:
all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other docu-
mentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received
by an agency of the United States Government under federal law or in connection
with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preserva-
tion by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization,
function, policies, decisions, procedures, operation, or other activities of the Gov-
ernment or because of the informational value of the data in them.
44 U.S.C. § 3301. The definition excludes "extra copies of documents preserved only for conven-
ience of reference, and stocks of publications and of processed documents." Id.
182 See American Friends Scrv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(explicitly rejecting the Kissinger Court's holding that the purpose of the FRA was "solely" to
benefit agencies and the Federal Government); Armstrong I, 924 F.2d 282, 287-88 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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goals.'" To administer the mountain of federal records, Congress cre-
ated the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA") as
an "independent" agency within the executive branch.'" The Archivist
is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate.'" Although the President may remove the Archivist from office,
he or she must "communicate the reasons" for the removal to each
house of Congress.' 86
 Thus, the President does not enjoy plenary power
with regard to the appointment and removal of the Archivist. 187 In
addition, Congress instructed that the President select the Archivist
based solely on "professional qualifications" and without regard to
political affiliation.'" The provision is designed to ensure that the
Archivist's decisions regarding preservation and access to historical
materials and records are based not on political or personal considera-
tions, but on unbiased professional judgment.' 89
The Archivist possesses clearly enumerated powers over federal
records.' 9° For example, the Archivist may promulgate regulations nec-
essary to "ensure adequate and proper documentation of the policies
and transactions of the Federal Government and ensuring proper
record disposition."'"' In addition, the Archivist may "conduct inspec-
tions or surveys of the records and the records management programs
and practices within and between the Federal Agencies."'" 2 The Archi-
vist may also oversee the disposal of records by establishing standards
for the "selective retention of records of continuing value" and by
assisting the federal agencies in applying those standards. 19" When the
Archivist has knowledge or believes that records are unlawfully threat-
ened (e.g. with removal or destruction), he or she must notify the head
of the agency in question and "assist the head of the agency in initiat-
ing action through the Attorney General." 184
 If the head of the agency
fails to initiate an action, the Archivist must then contact the Attorney
183 See infra notes 184-99 and accompanying text.
184 44 U.S.C. § 2102.
185 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a).
186 Id.
187 See id.
188 1d .
189
 See S. REP. No. 373, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3865,
3877; H.R. CONF. REP, No. 1124, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3894, 3895.
15° See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2108-11, 2904.
1 ° 1 44 U.S.C. § 2904(a).
182 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c) (7).
1 "44 U.S.C. § 2905(a).
184 Id.
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General directly to request that it be done and notify Congress that
such a request has been made. 195
Thus, any document created or received by the executive branch
must be either a record (presidential or federal) or a non-record.' 96
Congress has constructed elaborate mechanisms for ensuring that all
presidential and federal records are either retained or disposed of in
a judicious manner.' 97 The narrow scope of the exclusions for personal
records and extra copies underscores congressional desire that the
substantive materials created by the Government be preserved (or
properly disposed of) through the official records administration sys-
tem."' Similar to its provision for access to presidential records, Con-
gress had already provided for even greater access to federal records.' 99
2. The Freedom of Information Act
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And the people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power, which knowledge gives. 200
After its first attempt at providing public access to government
records failed, Congress, in 1974, passed the Freedom of Information
Act. 20 ' Congress recognized that the broad language of FOIA's prede-
cessor had been used as a means of withholding, rather than releasing
information, because it allowed agencies to withhold any information
for "good cause found."2°2 Thus, Congress drafted much stricter lan-
guage for FOIA. 2" Under FOIA, each agency must make its records
available to the public, unless the records fall into one of nine ex-
195 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a).
196 See 44 U.S.G. §§ 2201, 3301.
1117 See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-18, 2201-07, 2901-09, 3101-07, 3301-24.
198 See 44 U.S.G. §§ 2201, 3301.
199 See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2202-06; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2(19 SOURCE BOOK 1, supra note 9, at 6 (citing Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug.
4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Padover 1953)).
201 5 U.S.C. § 552. This first attempt at public access to federal records was the "Public
Information" section of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). SOURCE BOOK I, supra note 9,
at 24. The APA, which was adopted in 1946, was a broad statute designed to "bring sonic order
out of the growing chaos of Government regulation." Id. The APA set uniform standards for the
thousands of government administrative actions affecting the public, codified the common law
that allowed citizens to seek redress in the courts from wrongful government actions, and
provided for public participation in agency rule-making. Id. Under the APA, an individual could
only access records if he or she were "properly and directly concerned" with the records. Id. at
22. FOIA abolished this requirement Id.
"5 U.S.C. § 1002 (repealed); SOURCE BOOK 1, supra note 9, at 26.
2d 3 See SOURCE BOOK I, supra note 9, at 22.
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empted categories. 2°4 Those nine exemptions are: 1) information spe-
cifically authorized and properly classified under an executive order,
to be kept secret for national security reasons; 2) information solely
related to internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 3)
information exempted from disclosure by other statutes; 4) trade se-
crets; 5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda that would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
another agency; 6) information exempted under FOIA for privacy
reasons; 7) law enforcement records, which if released could interfere
with law enforcement of a person's right to a fair trial; 8) records
related to the regulation and supervision of financial institutions; and
9) geological information concerning wells."' Thus, in pursuit of its
disclosure goals, the statute takes full account of governMental needs
for confidentiality and individuals' rights to privacy. 208
In order to ensure that the records subject to FOR would actually
get to the public, Congress required that the agencies promulgate
regulations setting forth the procedures for obtaining documents and
the fees applicable to the processing of requests."' It also strictly lim-
ited the fees. 208 In addition, Congress mandated that requests be proc-
essed within ten days.209 Finally, Congress provided for judicial review
of the denial of FOIA requests."' Thus, Congress made every effort to
remove discretion from the individual agencies and thereby increase
the amount of information that would be released. 2 "
In 1974, in an effort to broaden the definition of agency, Congress
amended FOIA. 212 The 1974 amendments expanded and elaborated
on the agency definition adopted by the Administrative Procedures Act
("APA"), in order to eliminate ambiguity that had created confusion
204 Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1)—(9). Under the APA, an agency is defined as, "each authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1). The Act specifically excludes, however, certain entities such as
Congress and the courts of the United States. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (A)—(B). Thus, the term "agency"
was nut limited to executive branch entities, but also applied to legislative and judicial branch
entities other than those exempted. See id.
205 5 U.S.C. § 551 (A)—(B). For a detailed analysis of MIA and how to obtain documents
under it, see LITIGATION UNDER TILE FEDERAI. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY Act
(Allan Adler ed., 199'2).
216 SouRcE 130ox I, supra note 9, at 27.
2°7 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4).
208 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)(A)(ii) (11).
209 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6).
210 5 U.S.C. § 552(1)(4)(8).
211 See 5 U.S.C. § 552; SOURCE BOOK I, supra note 9, at 40-41.
212 S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 6267,6293.
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in the courts. 21 ' Currently, under FOIA, an agency is any entity that
qualifies as such under § 5M (1) of the APA, and in addition, any
executive or military department, any government or government-con-
trolled corporation, any establishment in the executive branch of Gov-
ernment (including the Executive Office of the President), and any
independent agency. 214
 Although FOIA does not specify exactly which
establishments within the EOP would be included, discussions sur-
rounding § 552(f) of FOIA did list specific EOP entities. 215 Most im-
portantly for the purposes of this Note, the legislative history indicates
that Congress intended that the National Security Council, as a unit
of the EOP, be considered an agency for purposes of FOIA. 215 In
contrast, the legislative history indicates that the President's immediate
personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose "sole function is to
advise and assist the President" are not included in the term agency. 217
Thus, the White House Office is not an agency for FOIA purposes. 21 s
Congress evidently recognized the difficulty of drawing clear lines
between agencies and non-agencies, especially in the part of the ex-
215 5 U.S.C. § 552(f); see Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 504 F.2d
238, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[R]ecent cases have made it clear that any general definition can
be of only limited utility to a court confronted with one of the myriad organizational arrange-
ments for getting the business of governments done.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
963 (1975).
214 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(1), 552(0.
215 H.R. REP. No. 876, 93cl Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in ComsarrtE OF THE JUDICIARY
01"11 IE U.S. SENATE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974, Pub. L, No.
93-502, 128, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (U.S. Government Printing Office 1975) [hereinafter SOURCE
Boos 11].
216 Id. This intention is clear from the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to FOIA,
which explains that "[t]he term 'establishment in the Executive Office of the President,' as used
in this amendment, means such functional entities as the Office of Telecommunications Policy,
the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the National Security
Council, the Federal Property Council, and other similar establishments which have been or may
in the future be created by Congress through statute or by Executive order." Id. at 128 (emphasis
added). This portion of the legislative history, however, has not been deemed conclusive. Rush-
forth v, Council of Economic Advisors, 762 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court held that the GEA
is riot an agency, despite the House Report's statement that it is a unit of the EOP intended to
be included in FOIA, because the Conference Report's decision to use the "advise and assist" test
for determining agency status, rather than a specific list of entities, "undercut" the House Report).
The Conference Report's flexible test, however, need not be construed as a rejection of the 1-louse
Report's list of entities covered by FOIA. Rather, it supports the notion that Congress intended
FOIA to apply broadly to many types of entities, including, but not limited to, those originally
enumerated.
217
 H.R. CONF. REP, No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6285, 6293.
21g See id.; Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980)
(transcripts of telephone conversations deemed not to be agency records made at Kissinger's
"White House Office").
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ecutive branch that works closely with the President. 219 Because each
President can create new entities within the EOP to serve his or her
needs and goals, and because each newly created entity will have a
distinct form and role, the courts will undoubtedly have to perform
this examination again.'" The next section surveys a number of cases
in which courts have interpreted the term "agency." 221
IV. CASES INTERPRETING THE RECORDS STATUTES
Although Congress sought clarity when it amended the Freedom
of Information Act in 1974, it may not have anticipated the challenge
presented to a court when reviewing a FOIA request for NSC records." 22
The circumstances of the NSC create a particularly difficult dilemma,
because the NSC was specifically designed to create a bridge between
the President and other, larger en tities. 2" The PRA focuses on entities
and individuals who advise and assist the President."' The FRA applies
to most other government entities. 2" If the NSC is an agency, then the
records it generates, uses and controls will likely be "agency records,"
which fall under the FRA and are immediately subject to FO1A. 22' If
the NSC is not an agency, then its records are subject to the PRA, which
would delay FOIA access for at least five years and which would permit
even greater discretion for withholding information for longer peri-
ods. 227 If the NSC is part agency and part advisory, then a line will have
to be drawn that will allow records officials at the NSC to distinguish
between agency records and presidential records and treat them ac-
cordingly. 2"
A. What is an agency?
An analysis of whether a set of documents are "agency records"
must begin by establishing whether two threshold requirements are
met."' First, the documents must be records."' Second, the documents
219 H.R. Co m,. REP. No, 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in Sotiket. hoot II,
supra note 215, at 232.
229 See infra notes 378-466 and accompanying text.
221 See infra notes 222-304 and accompanying text,
222 See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156; Armstrong 11, I F.3d 1274, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
223 See 50 U.S.C. § 402; SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 4-5.
229 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
225 ,rd.
226 See id.
227 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-04.
228 See Armstrong 11, 1 E3d 1274, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
229 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
230 Because the court in Armstrong determined that the e-mail documents in question are
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must be within the control of an agency. 2" As a preliminary matter,
therefore, an examination of the cases interpreting the definition of
"agency " is appropriate. 2n
1. Entities within the Executive Office of the President
The group of cases with the most similarities to the NSC involve
other entities within the EOP. 233 In 1970, in Soucie v. David, the first
case involving the determination of whether or not an EOP entity was
an agency, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the Office of Science Technology ("OST")
is an agency for purposes of FOIA.234 The OST was created in 1962 to
fulfill two functions: (1) to evaluate federal scientific research pro-
grams, and (2) to advise and assist the President in achieving coordi-
nated federal policies in science and technology. 235
The plaintiffs in Soucie sued the OST under FOIA to obtain a
document known as the "Garwin Report," which evaluated the Federal
Government's program for development of a supersonic aircraft. 236
The OST denied plaintiff's request for the document, asserting that
the Report was a presidential document not within OST's control and
alternatively, that it fell within FOIA's exemption for inter- and intra-
agency memoranda containing "opinions, conclusions and recommen-
dations prepared for the advice of the President." 237 The court dis-
agreed with OST's reasoning, finding that the executive authorization
plan creating the OST envisioned the office as a "distinct entity" sepa-
rate from the President's staff. 238 The court held that the OST's "inde-
pendent" function of evaluating federal programs made it an agency,
and thus, the Garwin Report was a federal record created by a federal
agency subject to FOIA.239 Although the court implied that it might
have come to a different conclusion had the OST's "sole function"
been to advise and assist the President, the fact that an independent
"records," this Note will not address that topic. For a hill discussion of that requirement, see
Comment, What is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom of Information Aces Threshold Require-
ment, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 40.
23i See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156.
232 See infra notes 233-304 and accompanying text.
2' See GOVERNMENT MANUAL., supra note 46, at 91-105.
2M 448 F.2d 1067,1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
235 1d. at 1073-74.
2S6 id. at 1070.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1074.
239 Soucie, 448 F.2c1 at 1075.
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function existed precluded that conclusion."" Thus, the OST's "sub-
stantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions"
determined its status as an agency.241
Three other entities within the Executive Office of the President
have been evaluated for their status as agency or non-agency."'" In 1978,
in Sierra Club v. Andrus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") is an agency.24" As a factor in its decision, the court
noted that the OMB's main duty, preparing the President's budget
proposal for submission to Congress, gave it policy-making control.'"
The court pointed to the OMB's "management, coordination and
administrative functions" as well, and noted that the Director of the
OMB is confirmed by the Senate, signifying the importance of OMB's
functions."'
In 1980, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on Environmental
Quality, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") is an agency."" The CEQ has three
members, each of whom is appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 247
 The President designates one of the three
as chairperson. 248
 In determining that the CEQ is an agency, the court
noted the similarities between the CEQ and the OST. 249
 For example,
like the OST, the CEQ has the role of "overseeing" the activities of
2411 Id. The examination as to whether an entity's sole purpose is to advise and assist the
President is limited to those entities within the FOP. Crooker v. Office of the Pardon Attorney,
614 F.2d 825, 828 (2d Cir, 1980) ("The 'advise and assist the President' language applies as a
limitation upon FOIA coverage only within the Executive Office ofthe President."). Consequently,
entities outside the EOP whose sole function is to advise and assist the President are subject to
FOIA. See id. at 827-28.
241 See Sonde, 448 F.2d at 1073. It should he noted that the legislative history of the 1974
FOIA amendments clearly shows that Congress intended to incorporate the Soutie "agency" test
into the FOIA statute. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156
(1980) (citing H.R. Cone. REP, No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in Source Book
II, supra note 215, at 232); H.R. Cntn . REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6293.
242 Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisors, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir, 1985); Pacific
Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2c1 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir, 1980) (explicitly
rejecting the argument dial an entity can be an agency generally, but not when it is advising the
President).
243 581 F.2d 895, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
2991d,
245 Id.
245 636 E2d at 1263.
247 1d. at 1261-62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4342).
M M. at 1262.
245 Id. at 1263.
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federal agencies."° Also similar to the OST, the CEQ is independently
authorized to "evaluate" federal programs. 25 I In addition to advising
and assisting the President, the CEQ issues regulations used by federal
agencies in implementing the National Environmental Policy Act. 252
Five years after declaring the CEQ to be an agency, in 1985, in
Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisors, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Council of Economic Advisors ("CEA") is not an
agency. 255 Although the statutes creating the CEA and the CEQ are
identical, the court reasoned that its prior holding that the CEQ was
an agency did not govern the case, due to crucial differences between
the CEQ and the CEA."' The court distinguished the CEA from the
CEQ by pointing to executive orders expanding the role of CEQ
beyond its statutory powers. 255
 No such executive orders have expanded
the CEA's role. 256 The court in Rushforth also distinguished the CEA
from the OST, which was examined in Soucie. 257 According to the court,
the CEA is different from the OST in that the OST can take "direct
action" and the CEA cannot.258 Thus, because its sole function is to
advise and assist the President, the CEA was found not to be an
age ncy. 259
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on
whether or not the NSC is an agency, it came close to doing so in 1980
in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 260 In Kissinger,
25°
 Id. at 1262.
251 Pa Cifir, 636 F.2d at 1263.
252 M at 1262.
255 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
254 Id. at 1042; Pacific,  636 F.2d at 1262. The statute creating the CEA enumerates various
duties: I) assist and advise the President in the preparation of the Economic Report, 2) gather
information, analyze and interpret information in light of established policies, and compile and
submit studies, 3) appraise various programs and activities of the Federal Government and make
recommendations to the President, 4) develop and recommend to the President national eco-
nomic policies, 5) make and furnish studies, and 6) submit an annual report. Rushforth, 762 F.2d
at 1042 n.6 (citing 15 U.S.C. . 1023). In fulfilling its duties, the Council may consult with
representatives of the private sector and governments. Id.
255 Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1041. These executive orders gave the CEQ the power to coordinate
Federal environmental regulatory programs, issue guidelines for preparing environmental impact
statement.% and promulgate regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National
Environmental I'olicy Act. Id.
256 Id. at 1042.
257 See id.
25" Id. The court noted that the OST had the power to initiate and support research, award
scholarships, Sister the interchange of information, and evaluate the status of the sciences in
correlating the research and education programs of the Foundation. Id.
25° Id. at 1043.
2°1 See 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). An opinion issued by the Office of the Legal Counsel of the
Department of justice in 1978 addresses the issue of whether or not the NSC is an agency.
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the Court held that the Executive Office of the President is an agency
subject to FOIA, but the President's "immediate personal staff or units
in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the
President" are not included within the term agency under FOIA. 26'Mr.
Kissinger served as Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs from 1969 to 1975 and as Secretary of State from 1973 to
1977.262 Columnist William Safire sued Mr. Kissinger, asking the court
to enforce FOIA requests covering documents, created by Mr. Kissin-
ger, that had been taken from the White House office to the State
Department, where they resided at the time the request was made,
which Kissinger then removed to a private estate and later donated
to the Library of Congress under an agreement restricting access to
them.263
 The Court reasoned that because the relevant request referred
only to Mr. Kissinger's White House office, and made no reference to
the NSC, the request sought records of conversations in which Mr.
Kissinger "acted in his capacity as presidential advisor, only."'" Thus,
as records of the Office of the President, which is not an agency, the
requested items were not subject to FOIA. 265 The Kissinger Court as-
sumed that the NSC is an agency subject to FO1A.266
 The court based
its assumption on the legislative history of the statute, which indicates
that the NSC is an establishment in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent to which FOIA applies. 267 The Court never ruled on the issue of
the NSC's or its Staffs legal status, however, because the Kissinger Court
National Security Council---Agency Status Under MIA, 2 Op. Oft Legal CAmusel 197 (1978).
The opinion concludes that the NSC is an agency because it has functions other than merely
advising and assisting the President. Id. at 204-05. The opinion states, however, that only some
NSC documents are agency records and that other documents could be protected by a claim of
"executive privilege." Id,
261 445 U.S. at 156 (citing H.R. CONF. RE1'. No. 1380, 95d Gong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK 11, su/n e note 215, at 232).
262 Id. at 139-40.
263 Id. at 139-44. The agreement provided that public access to the collection would not.
begin until 25 years alter the time of transfer or five years after his death, whichever was later.
Id. at 141. The Kissinger case involved two other plaintiffs, the Military Audit Project and the
Reporters Committee fOr Freedom of the Press. Id. at 143. The court found against these two
plaintiffs on different grounds, holding that they were not entitled to see the documents because
at the time their request was made, the State Department no longer had the documents in its
possession. Id. at 155. 'thus, the State Department did not "withhold" the documents in violation
of FOIA. Id.
264 Id. at 156.
2131 See id.
266 Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156; see also Armstrong 11, l F.3d 1274,1296 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The
Supreme Court appears to have assumed, without deciding the issue, that Ihe NSC is a FO1A
;Teller).
267 See 445 U.S. at 156.
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found that Kissinger created the documents in question in his capacity
as presidential advisor only and as a part of the White House Office.'"
The most recent judicial determination regarding what is and
what is not an agency under FOIA occurred in 1993, in Meyer v. Busk
where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Task Force on Regulatory Relief was not an
agency.'" The court articulated numerous factors relevant to its deci-
sion, such as how close operationally the entity is to the President, the
nature of the entity's delegation from the President, and whether the
agency has a self-contained structure.'" Generally, the court asserted,
those units whose characteristics closely resemble those of the Presi-
dent's personal staff would be exempt from FOIA.27 ' In determining
that the Task Force was not an agency, the court noted that the Task
Force has no separate staff, and no independent authority to direct
executive branch members. 272 Rather, the members of the Task Force
derived their authority from their positions as department heads, not
from the Task Force as an entity:273 The court in Meyer distinguished
the Task Force from the OMB, which was found to be an agency in
Sierra, stating that the OMB is permanent, and has a significant staff
with broadly delegated powers whereas the Task Force did no L274
2. Entities Outside the Executive Office of the President
Also relevant to an analysis of a set of documents which may or
may not be "agency records" are cases examining entities outside the
EOP to determine whether or not they are agencies.'" Courts have
used the Soucie factors in determining whether these entities constitute
agencies.'" In doing so, courts have elaborated on the tests laid out in
268 See id. The court has had the opportunity to explicitly state that the White House Office
is nut an agency. In 1990, in National Security Archive v. Archivist of the United States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that White House Counsel's
Office is not an agency for purposes of FOIA, reasoning that senior White House officials close
to the President may give "ad hoc" direction to executive branch members, but it is assumed that
they are passing on the President's wishes. 909 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
269 981 F.2d 1288, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In her dissent, Judge Wald argued that the Task
Force is an agency because it is a functional entity sufficiently independent of the President to
fall within the scope of FOIA. Id. at 1300-03 (Wald, J., dissenting).
270 Id. at 1293.
271 id.
272 Id. at 1296. The court emphasized that without a staff, one can hardly have independent
authority. Id. The court noted that the typical officer in the executive branch is virtually powerless
without a staff." Id.
273 1d, at 1294.
27d
	 981 F.2d at 1294.
275 See infra notes 278-304 and accompanying text_
276 Energy Research Found. v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 584-85
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Soucie. 277 For example, in 1973 in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corpo-
ration v. Renegotiation Board, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that Regional Renegotiation
Boards were agencies.278 A group of contractors sought to obtain cop-
ies of Regional Board Reports compiled by Regional Renegotiation
Boards, which are sub-units of the National Renegotiation Board, whose
role it is to renegotiate federal contracts. 27" The court reasoned that
the Regional Boards had "substantial independent authority." 2t't The
court pointed to the Regional Boards' investigation and negotiation
personnel, the formal recommendations made by the Regional Boards,
and the fact that the Regional Boards can make final decisions that are
not subject to review by the National Board. 2s 1
 Thus, in finding that
the Regional Boards are agencies, the court again demonstrated that
Soucie is the controlling test, but that under the Soucie test, each entity
will be examined separately to determine whether its unique charac-
teristics qualify it to be an agency, 282
Similarly, in 1980, in Crooker v. Office of the Pardon Attorney, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the Office
of the Pardon Attorney to be an agency. 283 In Crooker, a federal offender
sought to gain access to all records connected to his petition for
executive clemency. 284
 In finding that the Office is an agency and thus
that he could access its files through FOIA, the court noted that the
Office is authorized to perform "any other duties assigned by the
Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General."'" Thus, the fact
that the statute provided for expansion of the unit's duties became
significant to the determination that it is an agency. 286
Also in 1980, in another case involving the Department of Justice,
Ryan v. Department of Justice, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument that the At-
torney General was subject to FOIA in his capacity as head of the
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Rd., 482 F.2d 710, 715 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), aru'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168 (1975). But see Crooker v. Office of the Pardon
Attorney, 614 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the Soucie test does not apply to a unit of the
Department of justice whose sole function is to advise and assist the President because it is not
within the Executive Office of the President).
277 See infra notes 278-304 and accompanying text.
278 482 F.2d at 716.
270
 Id, at 711,
280 Id. at 715 (quoting Soucie v. David, 448 E2c1 1067 (1).C. Cir. 1971)),
281 id
282 See id. at 713-14.
2 /18 614 F.2d 825, 827 (2d Cir. 1980).
284 Id.
285 Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R § 0.35 (1979)).
28" See id.
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Department of Justice, and not subject to FOIA in his capacity as
advisor and assistant to the President for other purposes. 287 The court
held that, "[o]nce a unit is found to be an agency, this determina-
tion will not vary according to its specific function in each individual
case."288
 Thus, for entities outside the EOP, some courts have made it
clear that an entity is either an agency or not, it cannot have some
agency functions and some "advisory" functions. 289 Courts have re-
jected the idea of a hybrid that produces some presidential records
and some federal records. 29°
In 1990, in Energy Research Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, the District of Columbia Circuit determined that the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (the "Safety Board") is an
agency for purposes of FOIA.291
 In 1988 Congress created the Safety
Board, composed of five members appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to fulfill three functions: (1) to
review and evaluate safety standards, (2) to investigate practices or
events at Department of Energy facilities that may be hazardous to
public health, and (3) to recommend safety and health protection
measures to the Secretary of Energy:292
 Although the Secretary of
Energy must respond to the Safety Board's recommendations, the
Safety Board has no power to enforce its recommendations.2" The
Board does have other powers. 294
 For example, it can conduct hearings,
compel testimony, require production of documents, hire staff, prom-
ulgate its own regulations and require the Secretary to report to it
classified information.295
 In Crocker, the court indicated it would not
apply Soucie to entities outside the EOP. 296 In Energy Research Founda-
tion, however, the court analogized to its decision in Soucie, stating that
the Safety Board was similar to the OST in that it "investigates, evalu-
ates, recommends," and thus, it is an agency. 297
In other cases, courts have examined entities outside the Execu-
tive Office of the President and determined that they are not agencies
297
 61 7 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
288 Id.
289 See id.
299
 See
291 9 17 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
29'2
	 at 582.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
29" See supra note 277.
297 See Energy Research, 917 F.2d at 583 (citing Sonde v, David, 448 F.2d 1057, 1073 n,15 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
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for purposes of FOIA. 2" For example, in 1974, in Washington Research
Project u Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the District of
Columbia Circuit held that "initial review groups" (IRGs) set up by the
National Institute of Mental Health to review grant applications were
not agencies within the meaning of the APA. 2"" The court reasoned
that the IRGs do not have "authority in law to make decisions," and
thus, cannot be considered "authorities" of the United States."" Be-
cause the APA describes agencies as "each authority of the Government
of the United States," the IRGs cannot be agencies."'
In their examination of whether or not an entity is an agency,
courts generally apply a flexible test that allows them to pick and
choose among a variety of factors including how closely related the
entity is to the President, the size of the organization, its duties, respon-
sibilities and power." In addition, the way an agency was created and
its structure may all affect courts' ultimate decisions." A final factor
that courts consider is the actual record the plaintiff is trying to obtain,
because in many cases, and in the Armstrong case in particular, whether
the entity that created or controls the record is deemed to be an agency
is inextricably linked to what the record says or what import it has."
B. What is an agency record?
For a document to be subject to FOIA disclosure, it must be an
"agency record."" The fact that it was generated by, is, or was once in
the possession of an entity determined to be an agency does not
automatically subject it to FOIA." Numerous agencies have challenged
assertions that documents generated by or transferred to non-agencies
are agency records." Although possession of the record by an agency
2" See infra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
299 504 F.2d 238, 241-42, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
3"" Id. at 248.
"I Id.; see5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (1988).
9"2 See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. fm Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980);
Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); see also supra notes 234-301 and accompanying text.
9"5 See, e.g., Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156; Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see.also supra notes 234-301 and accompa-
nying text.
"4 See infra notes 305-25 and accompanying text.
31)5
 Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 n.8 (1980) ("since the enforcement provision of the
Act . . . refers only to 'agency records' it is certain that the disclosure obligations imposed .
were only to extend to agency records").
306 Id.
"7 See, e.g., Forsham, 445 U.S. at 171; Kissinger; 445 U.S. at 156; Wolfe v. Department of Health
and Human Services, 711 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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seems to be a threshold to whether it can be deemed an agency record,
mere possession of a record by an agency is not sufficient.'" Further-
more, some documents, although possessed by an agency, can never
become agency records. 309 Thus, some courts have required that there
be a sufficient nexus between the "agency" and the "records" for the
records to be deemed agency records.31 ° Although courts seem to have
declined to base agency record status on a record's origin, and instead
favor a test that looks to whether the agency "controls" the record, they
have never clearly defined "control." 3 "
In 1980, in Forsham v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court
held that records produced in connection with federal grant research
and retained by the private grantee were not agency records. 312 While
stating that it was possible for records of a non-agency to become
agency records, the Court reasoned that a record cannot be an agency
record within the meaning of FOIA unless the agency created or
obtained the record."' Furthermore, an agency must not only have a
legal right to obtain a record, but must have actually obtained the
record for it to be considered an agency record.'" Thus, possession is
a requirement for agency record status, but may not be sufficient to
create it."5 Possession plus a high degree of agency use, however, may
create "agency record" status. 3 ' 6
In 1983, in Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Services, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that
although the Department of Health and Human Services ("MS") had
access to certain reports, they were not agency records. 317 The case
306 Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 157 (physical location does not make items not subject to FOIA
subject to it).
"9 See, e.g., Lindsey v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 736 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1984)
(pre-sentence reports in possession of Bureau of Prisons remain court records); United States v.
Charmer Indus., 711 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983) (pre-sentence report created by the U.S.
Probation Service and in possession of the Arizona Attorney General not an "agency record");
Warth v. Department of Justice, 595 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1979) (court document not "agency
record" even when held and used by the Department of Justice),
3 I° Waft?, 711 F.2d at 1080 (courts look for some "nexus" between the agency and the
documents).
311 See Carson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
x11 445 U.S at 171,
313 Forsham, 445 U.S. at 181-82.
314 Id. at 186.
313 Id.
316 See id.; Carson, 631 F.2d at 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that pre-sentence reports used
by the Parole Commission and not subject to restrictions by their originator are "agency records");
1)/1(1ns v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming Carson).
317 711 F.2d at 1081-82; see also, Illinois Institute For Continuing Legal Educ. v. U.S. Dep't
of Labor, 545 F.Supp. 1229, 1235 (N.D. III. 1982).
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involved a report by President-elect Reagan's transition team evaluat-
ing HHS. 318
 The court articulated two approaches to the control test:
(I) focus on the intent of the document creator to retain control, or
(2) focus on the control exercised by the agency to whom the FOIA
request is addressed. 319 In Wolfe, the court chose the latter, finding that
because HHS did not use or rely upon the report and because it was
not integrated into HHS files, it did not become an "agency record." 32°
In sum, like the definition of "agency," the definition of "agency
record" is fluid."' A record's ultimate designation depends on who
created the document, who has control of it, and what it has been or
is being used for.322
 The lack of clarity in the definition of "agency
record" created a risk that agencies will manipulate the term to avoid
disclosure.323
 As the two approaches to the "control" test articulated in
Wolfe demonstrate, by choosing whether to focus on the intent of the
originator versus the actions of the possessing agency, courts have
tremendous freedom to choose which test to use, and can effectively
choose the result they prefer. 324
 Because the nature of electronic mail
is also fluid, in that it can easily be sent from one entity (the NSA) to
another (an NSC Staff member), the court in Armstrong will undoubt-
edly face difficulties of classifying records that have come from one
entity into the hands of another. 325
V. THE ARMSTRONG CASE
A. Facts
During the Reagan Administration and part of the Bush Admini-
stration, the Executive Office of the President used numerous elec-
tronic mail ("e-mail") systems. 32° The EOP and the NSC had separate
5t8 Wolfe, 711 F.2d at. 1078.
819 /d. at 1081 n.7 (citing cases).
32° Id, at 1080-82. The court relied on Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
which held that records transferred by Kissinger to the Department of State after he became
Secretary of State, but which were not generated by, in the control of, or relied upon by the State
Department, did not become agency records merely because of their location at the State
Department 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
321 See supra notes 305-20 and accompanying text
sn See supra notes 305-20 and accompanying text.
828 McGehee v. CIA, 697 E2d 1095, 1109, modified in other respects, 71! E2d 1076 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
324
 See, e.g., Wolfe, 711 F.2d at 1081 n.7; Carson v. United States Dep't of justice, 631 F.2d
1008, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Wirth v. Department of justice, 595 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1979).
325
 See infra notes 449-66 and accompanying text.
926 Armstrong II, 1 F,3d 1274, 1279 & n.2 (D.C. Cir, 1993). The EOP has used various
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systems. 327 These systems permit employees to communicate with each
other via electronic "notes" that can be sent from one computer to
another. 328 The systems were periodically "backed-up" onto computer
tapes. 32° The back-up is the equivalent of a "snapshot" of all the mate-
rial in the computer at that moment, and is created for use in the event
of a computer failure."° The EOP system was backed up nightly, and
the tapes were recycled after a number of weeks."' The NSC system
was backed up each Saturday evening, and the tapes were recycled after
two weeks. 332 In addition, the Administration preserved certain e-mail
back-up tapes as a result of the investigation into the Iran-Contra
scanda1. 333 Thus, at any given time, the Administration possessed a
series of back-ups a few weeks old. 334 In addition to the tapes existing
on January 19, 1989, which were covered by the original complaint,
and as a result of the amendment to the complaint in this case, all
Bush and Clinton Administration e-mail has been preserved. 335
B. The Litigation
The Reagan Administration's plan to dispose of all its remaining
computer back-up tapes before turning the computer system over to
the Bush Administration came to the attention of Scott Armstrong,
founder of the non-profit research institute called the National Secu-
electronic mail systems during the period of this litigation. These include: "PROFS" (an abbre-
viation for the IBM computer program called "Professional Office Systems") used from April,
1985 through the first half of 1992; "Al" (an abbreviation for the "All-in-One" program) used
from 1985 to the present; and "OASIS," installed in 1989. joint Statement of Facts at 1, Armstrong
II, I F.3d at 1274 (No. 89-142).
327 Armstrong II, I F.3d at 1279 & n.7.
328 Id. at 1279-80.
329 Id. at 1280.
33° Id.
331 Armstrong I, 924 F.2d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
332 Id. For purposes of this Note, any reference to the EOP is meant to apply to EOP entities
other than the NSC, which is referred to separately.
333 See Armstrong 11,1 F.3d at 1283 n.7. The court of appeals has acknowledged the substantive
nature of these e-mail documents. Id. at 1279, 1283 n.7.
The 1,300 federal employees with access to the EOP and NSC electronic mail
systems can, and apparently do, utilize them to relay lengthy substantive--even
classified—"notes" that, in content, are often indistinguishable from letters or
memoranda. But, in contrast to its paper cousin, e-mail can be delivered nearly
instantaneously at any time of the day or week. Additionally, in contrast to telephone
conversation, e-mail automatically creates a complete record of the exact informa-
tion users send and receive.
Id.
334 See Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 286.
"5 See supra notes 344-78 and accompanying text.
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rity Archives. 336 Armstrong and others filed a complaint against the
President, Vice President, NSC and National Archivist, alleging that the
tapes contained valuable presidential and federal records that risked
destruction in violation of the Presidential Records Act and the Federal
Records Acts."' The historical importance of documents created using
the e-mail systems is without question.338 NSC e-mail records (called
"PROFS notes" because of the computer software that the NSC uses)
have been used by the Tower Commission, congressional investigators
and the Independent Counsel in his investigations of the Iran-Contra
affair. 339 PROFS notes have also been used in the prosecution of Manuel
Noriega and the inquiry into the confirmation of Robert Gates as
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.'" Although the substantial
importance of the documents is now clear, their status as presidential
or federal records remains unresolved.341
C. Armstrong I
After the district court denied their motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, the defendants filed a motion for interlocutory
appeal, which was granted. 342 In 1991, in Armstrong v. Bush ("Armstrong
/"), the District of Columbia Circuit held that it could not review
presidential compliance with the PRA because the President is not an
agency for purposes of the APA. Thus, indirect judicial review of the
President's records creation and management decisions via the APA is
not permitted.'" In addition, direct review under the PRA is also
precluded. 344 The court of appeals reasoned that the textual silence of
the APA on the issue of the President as an agency, coupled with the
longstanding practice of the executive branch of not complying with
336 Affidavit of R. Scott Armstrong at 7, Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, I F.3d
1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142).
337 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Reliev at 5, Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Stipp. 343
(D.D.C. 1989) (No. 89-142).
338 See Armstrong II, I F.3d at 1283 n.7.
339 Id.
349 Id.
541 Id. at 1296,
342 Armstrong v. Bush, 721 E Stipp. 343, 354 (D.D.C. 1989); Order of . ]. Richey, Dec. 21, 1989
at 1, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 89-142).
393 1d.
344
	 924 F.2d at 289. The court of appeals also settled other issues, holding that
the plaintiffs had standing under the PRA and the FRA, that the Presidential Records Act
precludes judicial review of the "creation, management and disposal" of presidential records, and
that the establishment of guidelines and directives defining records uncles the Federal Records
Act is subject to,judicial review. Id. at 288, 290, 294.
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FOIA, precluded the President from being considered an agency de-
spite the broad definition in the statute."'
In a footnote in its background section, the court of appeals stated
that, because the NSC "advises the President" and has "statutory obli-
gations," it creates both presidential and federal records." 48 Thus, the
court seems to have taken the position that the NSC is both a presi-
dential advisory body and an agency, because only those who "advise
and assist the President" can create presidential records, and only
agencies can create federal records." 47 Another indication that the
court held the NSC to fall within the statutory definition of agency is
its statement that the APA authorizes judicial review of the NSC's
recordkeeping guidelines and directives." 8 Based on its findings, the
court of appeals denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, enabling the district court to proceed to a determination of
whether the NSC's recordkeeping guidelines were arbitrary and capri-
cious."49
D. Further Action in District Court
With regard to the NSC's e-mail, the district court's mandate was
to review the NSC document preservation guidelines, using the stand-
ards set out in the APA, to determine if those guidelines complied with
the FRA. 8" The district court found that the NSC guidelines governing
document preservation were arbitrary and capricious because they
provided no "reasonable" method of ensuring compliance with the
FRA, and because they did not distinguish between presidential and
federal records."51 The district court based its finding on the District
of Columbia Circuit's apparent acceptance of the defendant's assertion
that the NSC creates both presidential and federal records. 352 The
district court, however, also stated that the PRA's specific inclusion of
"units or individuals in the Executive Office of the President the
345 Id. at 288-89 (referring to 5 U.S.G. § 701(b) (1), which defines "agency" as "any authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency").
346 Id. at 286 n.2.
347 See id.
" Id. at 297. If the NSC was not an agency, the APA could not authorize such a review, since
the APA applies only to agencies. See id.
345 Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 297.
35a Id.
35l
 Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp, 335, 344 (D.D.C. 1993).
352 1d. at 347-48.
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function of which is to advise and assist the President," encompasses
the NSC.8"
In addition, the district court stated that "[t] he clear language of
the PRA and the history of this statute clearly demonstrate that the
NSC is entitled to segregate presidential and federal records." 854 Be-
cause it found that its power of review extended only to federal records,
the court ordered that any unit of the EOP, other than those whose
sole function is to advise and assist the President, must preserve all
records to ensure that no federal records are destroyed."' Thus, the
district court seemed to treat the NSC as a hybrid entity, one which
advises and assists the President, but also has agency functions."' The
district court found that it had power only to the extent that it could
require the preservation of federal records against destruction, where
the preservation guidelines had been inadequate." 7 The court stated
that guidelines describing presidential records were beyond its con-
trol. 558 The court provided no further guidance to the parties as to how
the federal records would be distinguished from the presidential re-
cords, and instead remanded the case to the Archivist to take immedi-
ate action to preserve the federal records in question, and instructed
the parties to process the FOIA request with all deliberate speed."'
E. Armstrong II
After the district court found the defendants in contempt for not
complying with its January 1993 orders, the court of appeals again took
up the Armstrong case on an interlocutory appea1. 36° Addressing the
district court's assertion that it had no power over presidential records
preservation, the court of appeals stated, "We did not hold in [Arm-
strong 1] that the President could designate any material he wishes as
presidential records. . . ."3"' The court of appeals held that guidelines
353 Id. at 347 (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 2203(b)). In holding that the NSC is subject to both the
Presidential and Federal Records Acts, the court. also noted that the manlier in which the
President maintains presidential records and the guidelines used in keeping the presidential
records were not before the court because they are not subject to judicial review. Id. at 348;
Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 291.
354 Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Stipp. at 347.
s5''
	 at 349.
356 See id.
357 Id. at 349-50 (holding that EOP and NSC records keeping practices violate the Federal
Records Acts and are arbitrary and capricious).
358 Id. at 349.
:159 Artnstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Stipp. at 350.
3t"} Armstrong II, I F.3d 1274,1277 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
361 Id. at 1293.
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describing which existing materials will be treated as presidential re-
cords are subject to judicial review, because of their inextricable link
to guidelines describing which materials will be treated as federal
records. 362
 The court of appeals found that guidelines describing which
existing materials will be treated as presidential records are distinct
from the presidential record "creation, management and disposal de-
cisions" that the court precluded from judicial review in Armstrong 1 363
Addressing the issue of the NSC's status as agency or non-agency,
the court of appeals stated that its footnote in the background section
of its Armstrong I opinion, which declared that the NSC creates both
presidential and federal records, was not a holding.361 The court of
appeals admonished the district court for relying on a background
section footnote for a decision of legal significance. 363 The court noted,
however, that the "sole function" test in Soucie has been consistently
used by courts engaging in an agency/non-agency determination. 366 In
addition, the court pointed out that the NSC has routinely conceded
its status as an agency. 367 The court of appeals, however, remanded the
matter to the district court, stating that the record did not contain
sufficient facts to decide the issue. 668 Thus, the court of appeals revoked
its implication that the NSC creates both federal and presidential
records, leaving open the possibility that it does, or that all its records
fall entirely in one or the other category. 369 In addition, the court gave
little guidance as to how the determination of the NSC's status should
be made. 57° Finally, the court never reached the issue of which NSC
records would be "agency records" and which would be "presidential
records," since that distinction can only come once the NSC has been
determined to be, at least in part, an agency. 37 '
362 See id. at 1294.
363
364
 Id. at 1296.
365 See Armstrong 11, 1 F.3.3 at 1296.
366 Id. at 1295.
367 Id. at 1296.
368 Id. The issue of the NSC's legal status was briefed in May 1993, prior to oral argument
and the subsequent opinion of the court of appeals. See Government's Opposition and Reply
Brief at 37-49, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142) ("Our argument is not
that the NSC ceases at any time to be an agency under the FRA. Our argument is instead that
the presidential records at issue here, though generated by the NSC Staff are not records of the
NSC,") (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
3611 See Armstrong II, I F.3d at 1296-97.
37° See id.
371 See infra notes 378-448 and accompanying text.
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F. Recent Activity
On March 25, 1994, the Government submitted a brief to the
district court that reversed all of its previous concessions with regard
to the NSC's status, and argues that the NSC is not an agency at all,
but exists solely to advise and assist the President."' The Government
asserts that the NSC's FOIA guidelines were promulgated and followed
not because the NSC creates any agency records, but instead because
the Government "chose" to handle the documents in that manner."'
In its brief, the Government explains that although it will process the
plaintiffs FOIA request pursuant to the district court's order, the NSC
Executive Secretary has directed the Office of Records and Access
Management at the NSC to revoke current NSC FOIA regulations
and to simultaneously issue voluntary disclosure guidelines."4 Thus,
the Government seeks to have all NSC records declared presidential,
thereby shielding them from FOIA, and from the eyes of the public,
until at least five years after the President has left office."• The plaintiffs
have expressed their disagreement with the Government's change of
heart, and have derided the Government's proposed voluntary disclo-
sure guidelines, calling them a "trust-me FOIA."" 8 Motions have been
filed on both sides, and oral argument on these issues is likely to be
set for late fall of 1994; whatever the district court's decision, the case
is likely to again find its way to the court of appeals, as it has twice
before."77
VI. TOWARDS A DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S RECORDS
In Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President ("Armstrong IF), the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
tried to balance its duty to review agency action against its need to show
deference to presidential discretion and privacy. 978 Absent a clear de-
termination of which records, if any, are agency records and which are
not, the employees at the NSC, and the researchers seeking to write
about the organization, will remain unsure about what documents fall
under which statutes and how those documents should be treated. It
"2 Defendant's March 25, 1994 Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 1.
573 Id. at 26.
574 Id. at 32 & n.26.
575 See supra notes 168-76 and accotnpallying text,
376jim McGee, Clinton Tries to Limit Access to NSC Data, WASH. PosT, Mar. 26, 1994, at Al.
377 Interyiew with Sheryl Walters, Stall' Member, National Security Archives (August, 1994).
378 See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1296-99.
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is therefore essential, both for the plaintiffs in this case and for all
future parties who may seek NSC documents, that a decision be made
regarding the status of the NSC and its documents, and that a rational
system of document designation and access be put in place.
The court in this case has four options. First, the court could
determine that the NSC is not an agency, and thus, its records are
subject only to the PRA. To do this, the court would have to find that
the NSC is entirely "presidential" and thus has no agency functions
whatsoever. 379
 The NSC Staff have demonstrated, however, that their
role goes well beyond mere "advising and assisting the President."ss4
The argument that the NSC Staff exists solely to advise and assist is
untenable, given the defendants' concession during the first five years
of the litigation that the NSC Staff engages in some "agency functions,"
and given the history of the NSC Staff in general.
Second, the court could declare that the NSC is a hybrid entity
that is part agency and thus only partly subject to the FRA. Soucie,
however, precludes such a decision, because it establishes an either/or
test with no middle ground. If an entity solely advises and assists the
President, it is presidential. If it has any agency functions, it is an
agency and everything it creates is subject to the FRA.
A third option available to the court is to declare that the NSC is,
in its entirety, an agency, and thus, all its records fall within the FRA.
This would, in turn, make the records generated by it and within its
control "agency records" immediately subject to FOIA.'" 1 This option
presents two major problems. First, records of the National Security
Advisor, in his or her capacity as chief of the NSC, would be subject to
the FRA. Due to the Kissinger case, however, the NSA would not be
subject to the FRA in his capacity of advisor to the President. 382 Thus,
some sort of delineation between the NSA's "presidential" documents
and the NSC's "federal" documents would have to be made. 383 Even if
this difficulty were solved, separation of powers problems also arise. By
passing the PRA, Congress clearly demonstrated its intent to maintain
an area of presidential authority in which the Chief Executive has
increased control over his records and those of his immediate advisors,
thereby reducing separation of powers concerns. In addition, Congress
articulated a concern for the President's ability to receive confidential
379
 Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 1.
58° SHotimAKER, supra note 53, at 22-47 (describing seven functions performed by NSC Staff).
381
 Sees U.S.C.§ 552 (1988).
382 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
383
	 Brief for Appellees at 42, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142).
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and frank advice from top advisors."4 The composition of the courts
has changed significantly since the Nixon case was decided. The pre-
sent Supreme Court may be more responsive to the presidential asser-
tions that Congress has violated the separation of powers doctrine by
exerting too much control over the President's ability to effectively
carry out his executive functions. 585
A fourth option exists that may go further towards balancing these
conflicting interests than the other three. This Note argues that the
NSC should not be regarded as one entity, but rather, as three: the
Office for National Security Affairs (located at the White House and
composed of the NSA, the Deputy NSA and their assistants), the NSC
(whose members meet periodically to make recommendations to the
President) and the NSC Staff (who carry out presidential national
security policy on a daily basis). Thus, under the Soucie test, the Office
for National Security Affairs would be an entity subject only to the PRA,
because it serves solely to advise and assist the President."86 Similarly,
the Council would be an entity subject to the PRA because it also serves
to advise and assist. Both these entities work in very close proximity to
the President."7 In contrast, the NSC Staff would be an entity subject
to the FRA because it serves both to guide and to implement presiden-
tial national security policy."' In addition, the NSC Staff is further
removed from the President than either the NSA or the Council, and
the Staff is much larger."' By viewing the NSC as three entities rather
than one, the court would provide a well-defined structure under
which document designation guidelines can be established.
A. The NSC Staff Operates as an Agency
The defendants in the Armstrong case originally conceded that for
some purposes, the NSC is an agency and thus creates federal re-
cords.s"0 They also argued, however, that for other purposes, the NSC
384 Soucie V. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See supra notes 234-42 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Soucie, and notes 128-221 and accompanying text for a
discussion of congressional intent in passing the records acts.
555 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.
Ct, 2130, 2143 (1992); Nixon v, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741 (1982).
586 FEDERAL STAFF DIRECTORY, supra note 50, at 20-22. See supra notes 45-75 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the difference between the NSA and the NSC Staff.
381 See Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 40 ("the President
himself serves on and presides over the NSC").
388
 See 50 U.S.G. § 402 (outlining functions of the NSC and its Staff),
389 Id.
590 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is no Genuine Issue at 3-4,
Armstrong II, I F.8c1 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142) (hereinafter Defendant's Statement of
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serves to "advise and assist the President" and therefore is not an
agency. 391
 No court has ever held that one agency can create both
federal and presidential records. 5J2 In Ryan v. Department of justice, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
specifically stated that an entity is either an agency or it is not. 393 Once
an entity is found to have agency functions, and thereby create agency
records, the determination on whether the rest of the entity is also an
agency will not vary according to the specific function for which an
individual record was created.394
 Thus, the NSC Staff should be found
to be an agency because some of its functions are agency functions. 395
The court in Armstrong should examine the NSC Staff under the
test traditionally used to determine whether an EOP unit is an agency.
That test, from Soucie, is commonly referred to as the "sole function"
tese96
 Under the "sole function" test, if the NSC Staff has any functions
other than that of advising and assisting the President, it fails the test
and must be considered an agency. 397
 Both past and current NSC Staffs
have performed, and continue to perform, functions similar to those
of entities found to be agencies under Soucie and its progeny.398
In Soucie, the court found that the OST is an agency, because it
is a "distinct entity" with "substantial independent authority," which
Material Facts] ("The National Security Council (NSC) staff also has a dual role in the EOP....
These responsibilities fall into two areas: (1) management of the interagency process for national
security affairs ... and (2) provision of advice to the President on national security matters... .
Documents constituting records generated or received by the NSC, therefore, may be either
agency or presidential records."); Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1296 (citing cases).
391
 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, supra note 390, at 3-4.
392
 See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1'296; see aLso Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (finding that one person, serving in two distinct capacities (NSA
and Secretary of State), could create both federal and presidential records). The reason one
agency cannot create both federal and presidential records is that the Soucie test, which Congress
chose to incorporate into FOIA, dictates that once the entity has been found to have any function
other than "advising and assisting" the President, it falls within the definition of agency and the
FRA requires that all its records be subject to the act. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988). The FRA makes
no provision for hybrids, and thus the courts have properly made none. See id.; Armstrong II, 1
F.3d at 1296.
393 617 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
394 Id.
"5 Although the EOP could be considered one unit of the executive, there has never been
any doubt that different parts of the EOP may be treated differently. See supra notes 234-59 and
accompanying text. Therefore, if the NSA, NSC Staff and the Council are viewed as distinct units
within the EOP, there should be no reason why they cannot be viewed as separate entities to be
treated independently for purposes of the records acts.
396
 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
397
 See id.
398 See supra notes 229-77 and accompanying text for a description of EOP units examined
for agency status.
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"evaluates federal programs." 299 These exact words describe the NSC
Staff. It is a distinct entity, housed separately from the Office for
National Security Affairs, which has been granted independent author-
ity to ensure that the President's national security decisions are, in fact,
implemented." The OST's purpose was twofold."' It was created in
1962 to evaluate programs and advise and assist the President in achiev-
ing coordinated federal policies."' Similarly, the NSC Staff plays a
"coordinating" and "oversight" role, ensuring that United States na-
tional security efforts are both consistent and efficient.'" Thus, the
court should find that the NSC Staff is also an agency.
Finding that the NSC Staff is an agency comports with the cases
following Soucie. 404 For example, the NSC Staff, like the CEQ, which
was held to be an agency in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on
Environmental Quality, has the authority to "oversee federal agencies."'"
Also similar to the CEQ, the NSC Staff is comprised of members who
are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.'" Thus, the structure of the NSC is similar to that of an entity
determined to be an agency. Defendants assert that the NSC should
instead be equated with the CFA, which was held not to be an agency."'
The CEA, however, was examined under and passed the Soucie "sole
function" test, whereas the NSC could not do so. 948 The court reasoned
that the CEA could take no direct action; thus, it was not an "authority"
of the government." The same cannot be said of the NSC.41° Even
before the Iran-Contra scandal, when NSC Staff engaged in actual
covert operations, the Staff has routinely taken direct action when
fulfilling its mandate to implement presidential policy. 4" Thus, the
399 Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073-75.
4°°Presidential Decision Directive 2, at 1 (Jan, 20, 1993) ("[T]he NSC shall be the Presi-
dent's] principle means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development
and implementation of national security policy."), reprinted in Defendant's Appendix of Exhibits
in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on the National
Security Council Recordkeeping Claims, at ex. 17, Armstrong 11,1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No.
89-142),
401 Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073-74.
902 Id.
403 See supra notes 50-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NSC Staff's role.
909 See	 448 F,2d at 1075.
905 636 F.2d 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir, 1980).
4" Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 402.
407 See Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 35-36.
408 Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisors, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
499 See id.
410 See SHOEMAKER, supra note 53, at 19-22.
411
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NSC and the CEA differ in a crucial aspect and should not be given
the same legal status.'" In addition, the NSC's apparent "lack of en-
forcement ability" should not serve as a bar to agency status. In Energy
Research Foundation v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the District
of Columbia Circuit held that despite a lack of power to enforce its
recommendations, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board was an agency.'"
Perhaps the only case that supports the proposition that the NSC
may be a non-agency is Meyer v. Bush, which involved the President's
Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 414 In that case, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit found that, because the task force consisted of persons who
derived their authority from their positions as department heads, not
from the Task Force, it was not an agency.'" In addition, the court
pointed to the Task Force's total lack of authority to direct anyone in
the executive branch."' A comparison used by the court, however,
makes it abundantly clear that Meyer cannot support the notion that
the NSC Staff is a non-agency. 417 In contrasting the Task Force to the
OMB, which is an agency, the court cited the fact that the OMB is
permanent, and that it has a significant staff with broadly delegated
powers."' There can be little doubt that the NSC is permanent and
that its staff is significant. 4" Although one could argue that the NSC
Staffs powers are not "broadly delegated," experience has demon-
strated that the NSC Staff exercises significant power to direct mem-
bers of the executive branch."'
In sum, if the NSC has any functions other than "advising and
assisting" the President, it must be considered a separate agency."'
412 The NSC's fluid role may also present an argument for it to be given non-agency status.
The courts, however, have consistently looked to the statutory powers of an entity when making
the agency determination. To reevaluate the NSC's status every four years depending on the
particular use to which a President is putting the agency would create a great deal of confusion.
413 9 1 7 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
414 98 1 F.2d 1288, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
415 Id. at 1244.
416 Id.
417 See id.
418 Id.
419 See FEDERAL STAFF DIRECTORY, supra note 50, at 20-22.
42f) Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1294; see SHOEMAKER, Supra note 53, at 21-22.
421 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Where there is the possibility of
misdesignating a record, the court's holding should ensure that error is made on the side of
making it a federal record, rather than a presidential one. This is because judicial review is
available under the FRA and not under the PRA. See supra notes 22 and 28 and accompanying
text for a discussion of judicial review under the records acts. If the initial error is made on the
side of presidential records designation, there is little chance it will be remedied, since no
independent body can review presidential records designation. Id.
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Although this determination may seem complicated by the fact that
each President uses the NSC in a distinct manner, this dilemma can
be resolved if one looks at the specific role of the NSC Staff in the
effectuation of United States national security policy. As the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia made clear in Rush-
forth v. Council of Economic Advisors, when it determined that despite
identical statutes the CEQ and CEA were not both agencies, one must
look beyond the words of the statute creating an entity when determin-
ing if it is an agency. 422
Even under its new argument, that the NSC is not an agency at
all, the defendants concede that from the time FOIA took effect in
1975 until the present, the NSC treated at least some of its records as
agency records. 4" Thus, the court has ample evidence that some of the
NSC's functions led numerous administrations to believe that FOIA
applied to it.42`1 It is therefore appropriate for the court to closely
examine those functions and compare them with other entities that
have been determined to be agencies, and in doing so, the court will
find that the NSC Staff does not pass the Soucie "sole function" test and
is therefore not an entity that exists solely to advise and assist the
President.425 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit should require that
NSC Staff comply with FOIA.
A finding that the NSC Staff operates as an agency subject to the
FRA and FOIA would facilitate NSC recordkeeping and access without
causing any danger to United States security, because under FOIA,
documents can be properly withheld through clearly outlined excep-
tions.42' In addition, such a decision would not hinder the NSA's ability
to freely communicate with and advise the President; records gener-
ated by the NSA at his White House office, and that remain within the
control of the White House, would not fall within the purview of the
NSC Staff and would therefore not be subject to immediate FOIA
scrutiny. They would instead receive the discretion available under the
PRA,427 A determination that the NSC's records are agency records
follows from the determination that the NSC is an agency.
422 762 F. Stipp. 1038, 1041 (D.D.C. 1985).
42S See Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 26 ("The NSC's past
practice in responding to FOIA requests can be traced to the promulgation of FOIA regulations
in February 1975 ....").
424 See id. at 26-27.
425 See. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075.
426Sec supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of FO1A exceptions.
427 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
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When comparing the NSC to those entities that have or have not
been found to be agencies, the court should follow the Soucie model,
drawing the clearest possible line between what is and what is not an
agency or an agency record, so that those maintaining the records
system and those trying to use it to obtain documents can be spared
from vague rules that send them to the courts for clarification at every
turn.Separation of the NSA and Council documents can occur as each
unit has distinct functions. The Council meeting minutes and other
Council documents could be kept apart from the documents used and
generated by the Staff and lower level committees. For example, the
pleadings demonstrate that the NSC uses a separate e-mail system from
other units of the EOP. 428 Distinguishing NSA documents from NSC
Staff documents, though a challenging task, is no more difficult than
distinguishing CEA "presidential" documents from the federal docu-
ments created by related agencies. The Court in Soucie v. David, by
articulating the "sole function" test, and Congress, by choosing to
incorporate that test into FOIA, sought a clear distinction between
agencies and non-agencies, so that records preservation, management
and access could be as efficient as possible. Because of the overlap in
responsibilities between agencies and presidential advisors, that task is
not as easy as it seems.
B. The NSC Staff Is Not a Hybrid
Were the District of Columbia Circuit to declare that the NSC,
including the NSC Staff, is a "hybrid" entity, and thus, some of its
records are presidential and some are federal (agency) records, the
decision would directly controvert Soucie. In addition, it would create
a need for records segregation of a different type. It would require a
segregation mechanism even more complex because the line would
not be drawn between the NSA, the Council and the Staff. Instead each
4 .'-'13 Anna K. Nelson, Foreign Policy Records and Papers: A Case Study of the Preservation and
Accessibility of One Group of Documents, 21-22 (1977) (on file with the Boston College Law Review).
[The Staff Secretary of the NSC] noted that there were two separate security files.
The institutional Files 'contain all National Security Study Memoranda and Deci-
sion Memoranda and all reports and recommendations prepared for the Council.
These files all include minutes of NSC sub-group meetings, briefing papers, and
material related to NSC organizations." In addition to these files there are non-in-
stitutional files maintained by NSC Staff, [The Staff Secretary of the NSC] described
these as materials used to brief the President, records of negotiations with foreign
governments, correspondence with foreign heads of state, etc. These papers, re-
garded as presidential papers, are filed separately and will leave the White House
with the President
Id.; see Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274, 1279 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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record would be evaluated to determine if it was created in furtherance
of one of the NSC's "statutory" (agency) functions or "advisory" func-
tions, and then would be designated as an agency record in the former
case and a presidential record in the latter. 429 Such a decision leaves
too much discretion in the hands of the records officers at the NSC
and creates a situation similar to that found unacceptable by Congress
under the original APA, where administrations used the records legis-
lation more to withhold than to disclose!'" The court should not find
that the NSC is a hybrid, which creates both federal and presidential
records, for that would create the impossible task of determining which
records fall into which category.
In the past, defendants have asserted that the NSC employees have
sufficient information to enable them to distinguish presidential from
federal records."' NSC records officials are instructed to decide, docu-
ment by document, whether an employee created a document in
connection with the "work of the . . . NSC" or rather, whether it
was created for the President, the NSA, or the Deputy NSA "inde-
pendently" of the meetings, policy and staff actions of the NSC. 4"2 If
an NSC staff member creates a document, it is difficult to imagine how
it could be considered "independent" of the NSC. Similarly, if the
Council creates a document, it is clearly not "independent" of the
meetings, policies and staff actions of the NSC. 433 A close examination
of the guidelines reveals that they are virtually meaningless because
they provide no helpful way to distinguish between presidential and
federal records.'" In addition, as Congress acknowledged when passing
FOIA, a strong incentive exists for each individual employee to desig-
nate all records as presidential, since the PRA provides for such limited
125 See WRITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF MANUAL E-1 (1988).
430 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text for a discussion of the APA and its
legislative history.
451
 WIIITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF MANUAL, supra note 429, at E-1. The White House Office
Staff Manual's only instructions on the issue of presidential versus federal records are as follows.
The records of the National Security Council staff are federal records if they were received or
created in connection with the work of the statutorily-created National Security Council (includ-
ing any interagency groups included under National Security Council auspices). Id. Additionally,
the NSC's internal administrative records are federal records. Id. The records of the National
Security Council staff are presidential records if they were received or created for the President,
the Assistant to the President for National Security, his Deputy or a member of the White 1-louse
staff independently of any meeting or policy and staff actions of the NSC or its various groups.
Id.
452 Id .
4" See id.
454 See id.
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public access (when compared with the FRA and FOIA). 4" Thus, the
court should require that the guidelines be clear, and that the line
between federal and presidential records be established along some
solid line, rather than along amorphous clauses such as "in connection
with" versus "independent of," which in effect leave total discretion to
the records designation officials and provide no guarantee of access to
the public."'
C. The NSC Staff Is Not Merely an "Advisory" Body
The District of Columbia Circuit should also reject the option of
holding that no part of the NSC is an agency, and thus that its records
are covered by the PRA, not the ERA."' Although this solution might
seem the simplest, the court's duty is not to find the simplest or most
politically expedient solution, but rather, to find the fairest, most
correct, yet feasible interpretation of the statute.'" To find that the
NSC creates no federal records would controvert both the clear lan-
guage of FOIA and the PRA, and the intent of all the records statutes
to provide a maximum of access to the public within the limits of
national security and presidential power.'" The court in Soucie, how-
ever, rejected the idea that an entity that exists to "advise and assist"
the President is only partially exempt from the FRA. 44° Thus, the fact
that the President directs the NSC in its functions and seeks advice
from it does not preclude it from being an agency."' In Meyer v. Bush,
the court reasoned that one can describe any executive branch entity
as "assisting" the President, because he is the Chief Executive."' Con-
135 See ,571Pra notes 168-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of access to records under
the Presidential Records Act.
4941 See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF MANUAL, supra note 429, at E-1.
437 This is the path proposed by the defendants, See Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 8, at 1.
433 Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e should act under the
assumption that Congress intended its enactment to have a meaningful effect and must, accord-
ingly, construe it so as to give it such effect.") (citing cases).
"9 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (directing that agency records be made available to the public);
§ 552(1) (defining an agency as any "authority" of the U.S. government, including entities within
the EOP, and excluding only the Immediate" staff of the President); 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988)
(directing that only records created by those who advise and assist the President be presidential
records) .
411) See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
441 See id.
442 981 F.2d 1288, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Every action taken by an executive branch official can be described as "assisting"
the President. On the other hand, the line cannot be drawn to include all those
[as agencies] who direct others in the executive branch because, contrary to the
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sequently, to extend non-agency status to the NSC would stretch the
PRA beyond any logical boundary,'"
The defendants' argument, in fact, proves too much. They assert
that the NSC, in its entirety, is an "arm" of the President because he
has the power to direct it. 4" They assert that because the Council is
made up of the President's top advisors, the Staff cannot be considered
an agency."' In the same breath, they assert that carrying out presiden-
tial responsibilities is an NSC function."' The flaw in these arguments
is that they apply not only to every entity within the EOP, but also to
many executive branch departments, such as the Department of State,
which is indisputably subject to FOIA. 447 Recent Clinton Administration
memoranda, which assert that the NSC is merely advisory, pale in
comparison to the NSC's forty years of history and nearly twenty years
of partial FOIA compliance.448
D. The E-mail Documents on the NSC System Contain Agency Records
Defendants would prefer that the court use a "control" test, which
would make a record presidential if it is generated by the NSC Staff
but controlled by the NSA.4" Thus, the defendants would have the
origination of the document be irrelevant to its status as "agency
record" or presidential record."' Though there is support for use of
"control" as a factor in determining whether a record is an agency
record, in this instance, using "control" as the single determining
factor would create an enormous incentive for NSC staffers to send
any "embarrassing" document over to the NSA to prevent its disclo-
legislative history and Kissinger, under that approach the White House staff would
be an agency.
Id,
445 See id,
444
 Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 23.
445 Id.
446 1d.
447 Afsher v. Department of State, 702 E2d 1225, 1228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
448 Memoranclutti from William Itoh, Executive Secretary, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(Mar. 25, 1994) (stating that the NSC is not subject to FOIA and revoking the NSC's existing
EOM guidelines), in Defendant's March 25, 1994, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at ex. 22.
449 Government's Opposition and Reply at 37-49, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(No. 89-142). Under the defendant's analysis, the NSC's "unique institutional structure" requires
that records generated by NSC Staff, in the performance of their advisory function, be controlled
by the National Security Advisor, an official who is outside the NSC and whose sole function is
to advise and assist the President. Thus, defendants conclude, "records controlled by nuts-agency
entities [the National Security Advisor] are not agency records even when they were initially
generated by agency [NSC] staff." Id.
450 See W/IM:, House MANUAL, supra note 429, at E-I.
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sure. 451
 FOIA's broad scope and specific, delineated, exceptions were
designed to eliminate such loopholes.452
Where communications pass between the White House office and
the NSC, the documents should be considered federal records if they
come into the control of, or are relied upon by, the NSC or its Staff.
Thus, the NSA communications with the President, which would not
be communicated to or relied upon by the NSC or its Staff, would
remain under the PRA. This would comport with the intent of the FRA
and FOIA. 455
 Those statutes sought to provide for public access to
records used in the agency decision-making process:154 Thus, it is logi-
cal to require that documents relied upon by the agency members also
be available to the public.
The Supreme Court held in Kissinger that certain documents
generated by the National Security Advisor which remained within his
control and were not relied upon by the NSC Staff were presidential
records:455
 Had the telephone logs at issue in that case been in the
possession of, or even "related to" the NSC, the Court indicated that
it might have come to a different conclusion. 456 Thus, the Court has
indicated that it is inclined to draw the line between records generated
by and within the control of the NSA, and those generated by and
relied upon by the statutorily created NSC. 457 Such a distinction is the
simplest and clearest to make among a host of less-than-perfect op-
tions. There are cases in which non-agency records become agency
records by virtue of their use by an agency. 458 The court should, how-
ever, avoid the quagmire it would enter were it to try to find a way to
distinguish between one NSC Staff record and another.
The Armstrong case was prompted by the Iran-Contra scanda1.4"
Were it not for Oliver North's escapades, and the attention drawn by
them to the electronic mail system, this litigation might never have
451 See supra notes 305-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of an
agency record.
452 See supra notes 200-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of congressional intent
in passing FOIA.
453 Id.
454 Id.
455 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136,155-56 (1980).
456 See id, at 156.
457 See id.
458 See supra notes 305-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of such cases. In Kissinger,
the Court held that once agency records have been removed from the agency to whom the FOIA
request was made, they cannot be retrieved pursuant to a FOIA request. 445 U.S. at 156-57. In
this case, the e-mail is still within the control of a federal agency (the National Archives), and
the National Archives was named in the FOIA request. Amended Complaint at I, Armstrong v.
Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1989) (No. 98-142).
459 See supra notes 326-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Arinstronglitigation.
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been brought. 46" It could be argued, then, that this entire issue is a red
herring. The NSC has been reined in and will no longer be conducting
covert operations, so the treatment of its records as presidential or
federal is of little consequence. This argument does not acknowledge,
however, that the NSC plays an essential role in the formulation of
United States foreign policy. Furthermore, as the complexity of na-
tional security issues increases, the NSC and its Staff, as the filter for
high-level national security policy deliberations and implementation,
are likely to take on an even greater role in the direction of the
nation. 161 Consequently, public access to NSC records is likely to take
on greater importance as well.
At the heart of our democracy is the notion that unchecked power
will be abused, so we should be vigilant and "submit ourselves to rulers
if only under rules."'" The facts of Armstrong again demonstrate that
records, particularly unflattering ones, will not be preserved or dis-
closed voluntarily. The defendants in Armstrong assert that "active over-
sight" by the Archivist, combined with completely voluntary disclosure
rules, should be the "principle enforcement mechanism" of records
preservation at the NSC. 465 In her declaration to the court, however,
Deputy Archivist Claudine Weiher stated that the National Archives
and Records Administration has "no role in the determination of
whether a particular document is a 'record. "464
 She also stated that it
is not the Archive's function to "maintain documents in any particular
physical form."465 Thus, the Archivist has not demonstrated an ability
to ensure preservation and disclosure of NSC documents. 4° If demo-
cratic principles of government by the people are to be upheld, the
courts must intercede and enforce statutes passed by the legislature
that ensure that the people know how they are being governed.
E. Broader Concerns About the Treatment of Electronic Data Both Now
and in the Future
The Armstrong case raises one further area of concern for those
creating and seeking access to government records. Although the
analysis of this Note has focused on one specific legal issue in the area
461)
 See Armstrong II, 1 17.3(1 at 1283 n.7.
461
 S/I0E-MAKER, supra note 53, at 21-27.
462 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
463 .Appellant's Brief at 39, Armstrong a I F.3(1 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 89-142).
464 Declaration of Claudine Weiher at 3, Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No.
89-142).
465 id .
466 See id.
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of records preservation, there is cause for much broader attention to
the efforts at preservation of our historical heritage. This case provides
only an isolated example of how those responsible for records preser-
vation have not addressed electronic mail and the electronic media in
general. The electronic age has brought with it a host of problems
related to record keeping:167
 Although Congress, when enacting the
Federal and Presidential Records Acts, intended to provide for situ-
ations involving the most modern methods of records creation and
preservation, as well as for those that had not yet been created, the
statutes are, nonetheless, showing their age. 468
For example, the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Arm-
strong II indicates that if the electronic mail systems at the EOP are
reconfigured to print out all the information regarding a specific
electronic document, then the paper copy would be adequate and the
electronic copy could be disposed of as an "extra copy."'" Most people
who are familiar with electronic data, however, would agree that a
paper "copy" of an electronic document is not a copy at all. For
historians, researchers and librarians, printing out a copy of an elec-
tronic record for research purposes is much like translating a docu-
ment from standard English into Braille. 470 As is evidenced by the
searches already performed on the e-mail tapes for the benefit of
Casper Weinberger and others who sought information from them,
electronic records are most useful in their electronic form. 471 Histori-
ans and other researchers should have access to records in the same
form in which they were created and used by those who made history.
The fact that the Archivist at the time of this litigation did not
even have a machine capable of reading the e-mail tapes is an indica-
tion of the lack of attention this area has received. 472
 How can the
Archivist meet the goals of the PRA, FRA and FOIA if he or she cannot
even read the records? Those who control the information about our
government can control what we know about how we are governed.
The seemingly endless growth in bureaucracy compounds the chal-
467
 See Armstrong II, I F.3d at 1283 & n.7.
4°8 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 3301 (1988).
466 See Armstrong II, I FM at 1283 (implying that if "the paper versions include all significant
material contained in the electronic records,' the electronic version could be treated as an extra
copy and destroyed).
47° Interview with Anthony Farley, Professor, Boston College Law School, Newton, Mass. (Nov.
1993).
471
 Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 830 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
472 Defendant's Response to Interrogatories at 6, Armstrong II, I F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(No. 89-142).
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lenges facing those who would examine and inform us of our history.
If we ever truly hope to receive answers to the recurring questions
"Who knew what and when?" or "Why did this happen?" we will have
to pay closer attention to the changing realities of information crea-
tion, dissemination and preservation in an electronic age.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our democracy is founded on the notion that the public has a
right to know, within reason, what its government is doing and how
decisions are being made that will affect the lives of the nation's
citizens. The attempt by the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations
to avert public disclosure of NSC documents runs counter to that
concept, and to the intent of Congress in upholding and affirmatively
protecting that principle through the FRA, PRA and FOIA. Further-
more, presidential interests in maintaining secrecy are not sufficiently
justified by national security concerns, which are met by FOIA exemp-
tions, nor by separation of powers issues, to warrant a judicial grant of
total discretion to the President in this area. Therefore, the court
should fulfill its duty to the Congress, to the President, and to the
public, by finding that the NSC Staff operates as an agency so that its
records are subject to FOIA, but that the NSA and the Council operate
solely to advise the President, and are thus subject only to the PRA.
Such a finding would provide the President with ample protection for
confidential advice, and would ensure that the NSA, the NSC and the
NSC Staff remain useful tools for the President and the nation in
implementing our foreign policy. At the same time, such a finding
would afford an appropriate level of accountability to the American
people for decisions made and actions taken on their behalf.
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